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I Introduction
Tax evasion, a pervasive problem in developing countries and a non-trivial one
in developed countries, is constrained by the threat of detection and punishment,
as highlighted in the canonical deterrence model of tax evasion due to Allingham
& Sandmo (1972). It may also be constrained by social and psychological factors
(Andreoni et al., 1998). Some individuals may feel guilt or shame from evading or
pride from fulfilling their civic duty, while others may be influenced by peer be-
havior and the possibility of approval or sanctions from peers (Luttmer & Singhal,
2014). Similarly, individuals may have intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Dwenger
et al., 2016). While the existence of these social and psychological factors is increas-
ingly being recognized, there is still little empirical work on how important they
are and whether governments can prime them for resource mobilization.
In this paper, we examine the consequences of two Pakistani programs to study
these issues. In the first of these programs, the government began revealing the
amount of income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country. The public disclosure
program was instigated by a series of press reports documenting that the majority
of lawmakers of the country had not been fulfilling their tax obligations. It began
in tax year 2012 and has continued since then. Each year, two tax directories are
published, one for the Members of Parliament (MPs) and one for all taxpayers. The
directories are available online in a searchable PDF format and can be downloaded
freely by anyone. The directory for general taxpayers reveals the name, a numerical
tax identifier, and the tax paid by each taxpayer. The directory for MPs also lists
the constituency they serve.
The second program we examine publicly recognizes and rewards top taxpay-
ers of the country. The Taxpayers Privileges and Honour Card (TPHC) program
began concurrently with the public disclosure program. It acknowledges the top
100 taxpayers in each of four categories—self-employed individuals, wage-earners,
partnerships, and corporations—and grants them certain privileges. The Honour
Card holders are invited to a special ceremony hosted by the Prime Minister each
year to “recognize their services to the nation,” as well as to the state dinners held
on the Pakistan and Republic Day. In addition, they are eligible for benefits such as
fast-track immigration and gratis passports. The personal benefits of the program
are conferred on the partner with the maximum capital contribution in case of a
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partnership and on the CEO in case of a corporation.
These programs can influence tax compliance through a number of channels.
The disclosed information can expose an agent as a tax cheat if the tax payment does
not conform with the level of income, consumption, or wealth observed by neigh-
bors, friends, and other peer networks. The information can encourage whistle-
blowers to come forward, increasing the expected costs of evasion through the
conventional channel of the deterrence framework. The shame and guilt result-
ing from the disclosure can also induce greater tax compliance. On the other hand,
the programs may stimulate feelings of pride and positive self-image if one is re-
vealed to be a compliant or top taxpayer. The programs also let agents signal their
types. Some individuals may obtain higher utility from the public appreciation of
their level of aﬄuence (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Glazer & Konrad, 1996), while
others may monetize the goodwill offered by the programs, translating the social
recognition into higher sales and profits.
The tax directory, as we note above, lists the name and a numerical identifier
of each taxpayer. The numeric identifier is effectively private information, known
primarily to the agent and tax administration. Thus, the only publicly-disclosed in-
formation that can link an observation in the directory to a particular taxpayer is the
name. Pakistani names do not follow the standardWestern syntax of given name +
middle name + surname. Instead, a typical Pakistani name is composed of two or
more given names. One of these given names—usually themost-called name of the
father or husband—serves as the surname. Surnames in this way are usually not
fixed across generations and vary even within the nuclear family. Because of these
naming conventions, it is quite common for people to have the same full name. For
example, the most frequent name in our data, Muhammad Aslam, appears 15,598
times in four years, with a typical year’s directory containing more than 60 pages
listing the name Muhammad Aslam alone. On the other hand, about one-third of
taxpayers have unique names. This variation in name commonness implies that
the intensity of the disclosure varies considerably across individuals depending
upon how common their name is. Taxpayers with very frequent names enjoy vir-
tual anonymity in the disclosed records; uniquely-named taxpayers, on the other
hand, are exposed perfectly. We exploit this variation in treatment intensity in our
empirical strategy, comparing the change in tax payments across taxpayers with
frequent and unique names.
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Of course, names are not randomly assigned. Instead, they are chosen by par-
ents and hence may be correlated with parental traits such as income, education,
and ethnicity. We always include individual fixed effects in our empirical models,
implying that parental traits will influence our estimates only if their effect changes
over time, in particular contemporaneouslywith the program. We provide two sets
of tests to rule out this and related concerns. First, we show through both visual
and regression-based evidence that the tax payments of the compared groups were
trending similarly in the six pre-program periods: the relative difference in the out-
comewas indistinguishable fromzero for virtually all these years. Second, we show
that the name of a taxpayer bears no association with the outcome in the sample
of taxpayers (MPs) where the disclosure intensity is independent of the name com-
monness.
The TPHC program applies only to the top 100 taxpayers of each category. We
leverage this discontinuity in program eligibility to estimate its impacts. If social
recognition and related benefits offered by the program are valued, taxpayers close
to the eligibility cutoff will increase their tax payments in order to remain in, or
enter into, the top 100 club. We test this by comparing the yearly growth in tax
liability reported by agents close to the cutoff with other top taxpayers. To show
that our estimates are not driven by factors unrelated to the program such as rising
inequality at the top, we run placebo regressions estimating the program effects in
pre-intervention periods and on unaffected groups.
We combine the disclosed data of the years 2012-2015with administrative tax re-
turn data from 2006-2012 to create a long panel of tax records from 2006 to 2015. We
document four key findings. First, the exposure of tax information induced a sub-
stantial response from the treated taxpayers. The tax liability reported by taxpayers
with less common names on average increased by around 9 log points as a result of
the program. Consistent with our expectations, the estimated effect varies directly
with the program intensity. It is strongest in the left-tail of the name-frequency
distribution, declines monotonically as we move rightward, and becomes insignifi-
cant as the name-frequency approaches 300 (i.e., the name of the taxpayer appears
at least 300 times in the four years of disclosed data). Along the extensive mar-
gin, the program caused a 1-2 log points increase in tax filing by individuals with
less common names relative to others. Second, the disclosure had a far stronger
impact on MPs. The tax liability reported by them surged by more than 40 log
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points, and their tax filing rate jumped up by around 60 percentage points, from
around 30% to more than 90%. The stronger response from MPs is not surprising.
They are likely to be more sensitive to the revealed information because in addition
to inducing shame and guilt it can reduce their re-election probability. The disclo-
sure was alsomore salient for them. Theywere explicitly identified in the disclosed
records through their constituency numbers, and themediawasmore likely to pick
on their noncompliance. Third, the TPHC program also had a large impact. In a
sample containing top 1000 taxpayers of each category, the tax liability reported by
70-130 ranked taxpayers grew by nearly 17 log points faster than others as a result
of the program. This estimate declines slightly as we widen the treatment window,
suggesting that, as hypothesized, the effect is concentrated around the eligibility
cutoff of the program. Finally, we document that our estimates are highly robust to
alternative specifications and the identification concerns noted above.
Our analysis convincingly shows that the public disclosure caused a substan-
tial increase in tax compliance. This increase could be due to a perception that the
chance of evasion being detected has increased. It could also be due to a shift in
social norms towards compliance. We evaluate the latter possibility in two ways.
First, we exploit the spatial element of our data and categorize neighborhoods on
the basis of their demographic makeup as “more compliant” or “less compliant”.
We then investigate how the dynamics of the public disclosure response varies
across the two categories. We find that both types of neighborhoods were very
similar initially, but over time the tax payments of bottom taxpayers in the more
compliant neighborhoods started growing relative to bottom taxpayers in the less
compliant neighborhoods, while the tax payments of top taxpayers stayed almost
the same.1 This catch-up pattern of response is consistent with a model in which
the presence of compliant peers creates pressure on noncompliant ones to conform
(Bursztyn & Jensen, 2015). Second, we investigate if the electorate rewarded or
punished MPs in the next general election, held in July 2018, on the basis of their
tax payments, which became public information from 2012. We find a strong, pos-
itive association between tax payment and electoral success. Taken together, the
two pieces of evidence suggest that the public disclosure and TPHC programsmay
also have initiated a shift of the social equilibrium toward compliance.
1We define top taxpayer as someone who is in the top quartile of the tax liability distribution in
the baseline year i.e. 2012. The rest of the taxpayers are treated as bottom taxpayers.
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Our results have important policy implications. The programs we study cost
little in terms of economic resources. Thus, to the extent that they are effective in
influencing both private and social behavior, they potentially offer a cost-effective
complement to the standard measures governments undertake to deter tax evasion
such as audits and information reporting requirements. Of course, any such policy
needs to balance the pro-social impacts against concerns such as privacy.2
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature that assesses the influ-
ence of factors both within and outside the standard expected utility framework
on tax compliance (see Slemrod, Forthcoming and Luttmer & Singhal, 2014 for sur-
veys). More specifically, Hasegawa et al. (2012), Bø et al. (2015), and Hoopes et al.
(Forthcoming) study the impact of public disclosure on tax compliance in Japan,
Norway, and Australia, respectively. The studies of the Australian and Japanese
programs, which both had thresholds, revealed that some individuals and busi-
nesses take actions to avoid disclosure, but no evidence was found that the pro-
grams enhanced compliance. In Norway, though, a novel identification strategy
suggested that increasing the ease of access to the tax data via the internet signifi-
cantly increased reported self-employment income. Dwenger et al. (2016) conduct
a field experiment in Germany to assess the importance of intrinsic motivation in
tax compliance. In addition, a strand of literature runs field/lab experiments to
study social motivations in tax payments (see, for example, Slemrod et al., 2001 and
Fellner et al., 2013). A few of these experiments employ treatment arms that reward
taxpayers for compliant behavior, but we are not aware of a national program like
Pakistan’s that has been heretofore studied.
Remarkably, all the aforementioned studies have developed-country settings.
Taxation capacity in developing countries is limited and evasion pervasive, and it
is likely that collective and individual attitudes toward evasion hence would not be
the same there as in developed countries. While a robust public finance literature
is emerging in developing countries (see, for example, Kleven & Waseem, 2013;
Pomeranz, 2015; Waseem, 2018b,c), to our knowledge there still does not exist any
study of social and psychological motivations in tax payments from a developing
country perspective.
2Issues created by the public disclosure of tax payments are discussed at more length in Lenter
et al. (2003); Blank (2014). In addition to privacy, public disclosure can expose aﬄuent individuals
to unwarranted and even dangerous attention, as well as pleas from relations and peers to share
their aﬄuence.
6
The Pakistani public tax disclosure program has been studied in one recent po-
litical science paper. Malik (2017) investigates the impact of the program on the tax
reporting behavior of MPs. She uses two years’ publicly available data to assess
if MPs in more competitive races respond more aggressively to the program than
others and similar political economy questions. As we note above, the primary fo-
cus of our paper is the universe of tax filers and is not limited to MPs. Even for
the subsample of MPs, our analysis differs substantially fromMalik’s in both focus
and methodology. We analyze a long panel spanning ten years, include both indi-
vidual and time fixed effects in our empirical models, employ a novel identification
strategy based on name commonness, and study a distinct set of questions.
II Context
In this section, we describe features of the Pakistani environment that are important
for our empirical analysis.
II.A Public Disclosure Program
In the first of two programs we study, the Pakistani government started publishing
a tax directory each year, revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the coun-
try.3 The policy change (in large part) was instigated by a string of investigative
reports that began appearing in the Pakistani press in the latter half of 2012. The
reports focused primarily on the tax affairs of lawmakers of the country, document-
ing that a majority of them had apparently not been fulfilling their tax obligations.
Combining data leaked by whistle-blowers with the official data obtained through
the Election Commission of Pakistan, the reports painted quite a bleak picture of
tax compliance among the MPs of the country. It was reported that around 66% of
them—including 34 out of 55 federal ministers—had not filed their tax return for
the latest year; in fact, about 20% of them had not even obtained the National Tax
Number, which is the first requirement for tax filing (Center for Investigative Re-
porting in Pakistan, 2012). These revelations, compiled into two papers published
3Tax paid here refers to the self-assessed tax liability reported by a taxpayer in its annual income
tax return, which includes any tax withheld at source. Pakistani tax code requires that this self-
assessed tax liability should be deposited into the treasury at the time of filing of return. For this
reason, we use the terms tax paid and tax liability interchangeably in this paper.
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by the Center of Investigative Reporting in Pakistan (CIRP), generated strong re-
action. The Federal Tax Ombudsman, upon a representation filed by a citizen, or-
dered the government to begin disclosing the tax remitted by every public office
holder in the country. The leading opposition party at the time went even further,
pledging to publish the amount of tax remitted by all taxpayers in the country if
elected to power. This party won the next elections and formed the federal gov-
ernment in May 2013. It fulfilled its election promise and began publishing the tax
records for the tax year 2012 onward, which were due to be filed by December 15,
2013.4
Since the institution of the program in 2012, two tax directories are published
each year, one for MPs and the other for all taxpayers. These directories are posted
online on the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)’s website in a searchable PDF for-
mat.5 They can also be downloaded freely by anyone. The directory for general
taxpayers reveals the name, tax identifier, and tax liability of each taxpayer. This
information—sorted alphabetically on the full name—is provided separately for
corporations, partnerships, and individuals. The tax identifier is either the nine-
digit National Tax Number (NTN), disclosed with the tax year 2012 data, or the
13-digit Computerized National Identity Card Number (CNIC), disclosed with the
2013 tax year data and thereafter, both of which are effectively private information
of agents.6 Therefore, the only information through which an observation in the
directory can be readily linked to a taxpayer is the name.7 In contrast, the direc-
4The Pakistani tax year runs from July to June. Any year t in this paper denotes the tax year from
July t to June t+ 1.
5In fact, the title page of the directory contains the following direction in a very salient yellow
box: “Please press CTRL + F Key to Search the Record”.
6The NTN is used exclusively for tax filing. It was issued sequentially beginning in 1995, so the
number reveals some information about how long a taxpayer has been in the tax net. TheCNIC is the
primary identification and proof of citizenship document in Pakistan. It is required for most official
services including obtaining a passport, driving license, utility connection, opening and operating
bank accounts. The first few digits of the CNIC indicate the district (of 128 in Pakistan) where the
individual resided at the time of initial registration.
7FBR provides an online taxpayer verification service through which tax identifiers can be used
to obtain additional taxpayer information, namely address (at the time of registration), registration
date and regional tax office. This additional information may improve the chances of linking an ob-
servation in the directory to a taxpayer butmay still not be sufficient. A taxpayer’s addressmay have
changed since they first registered for an NTN or it may not be public information. Additionally,
there is a significant effort cost of obtaining the information and it is increasing in the commonness
of the taxpayer’s name. The tax identifiers of all taxpayers with a particular name would have to
be manually entered one at a time to obtain the additional information and online security features
prevent the process from being automated. The effective disclosure intensity therefore is still linked
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tory of parliamentarians also contains the constituency number an MP serves and
therefore the disclosed information can be linked to them fairly easily.
Table I lists important events in the public disclosure program. The timing of
these events is important for our empirical analysis, in particular in deciding from
which period the program would begin affecting behavior. As we note above, the
political party committed to the full public disclosure had come into power in May
2013. The last date for filing the 2012 tax return was December 15, 2013.8 Thus,
by the time the 2012 returns were filed, it was clear that the tax remitted through
themwould be made public. We accordingly treat tax year 2012 (which covers July
2012 - June 2013) as the first post-program year in our analysis. Although the exact
format of the disclosure was not known at the time, it was clear that it would, at a
minimum, include the name of the taxpayer. The name is a primary, and to some
extent the only, information through which the public can link a tax return to a
taxpayer, and therefore there could be no meaningful disclosure without it.9
As we note above, the MPs’ directory also contains the constituency number
they serve. Table A.I reports the composition of the Pakistani legislature. Because
the country has a limited number ofMPs, their identities arewell known, especially
in their electoral constituencies. Their exposure to the program therefore must be
independent of how common their name is. We use this feature of the program as
a specification check on our empirical strategy.
Both sets of directories receive wide coverage in the Pakistani media, especially
at the time they are released. For example, simple Google searches of “FBR Tax Di-
rectory” and “Parliamentarians Tax Directory” looking for the occurrence of these
words as exact phrases return 1,010 and 8,560 results.10 It means that there are at
least 1,010 (and potentially manymore)11 active web pages that discuss the two sets
of Pakistani tax directories. This profusion of information creates a strong first stage
in our setting in the sense that many Pakistani taxpayers are aware that their dis-
primarily to the commonness of the taxpayer’s name.
8Generally, amajority of tax returns are filed in the last fewweeks before the due date. Consistent
with this trend, more than 90% of the 2012 returns in our data were filed in or after October 2013.
9The CIRP reports that precipitated the full public disclosure program always used the name as
the primary identifier of a taxpayer.
10This data was accessed on May 28, 2019 in Manchester, UK.
11Similar Google searches looking for the occurrence of “FBR Tax Directory” and “Parliamentari-
ans Tax Directory” not as exact phrases return 169,000 and 160,000 results, suggesting that there are
potentially many more active web pages that discuss the two sets of directories.
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closed tax data would remain available online for the foreseeable future and could
be accessed anytime by their peer networks. Note that the income tax exemption
threshold in Pakistan, like other developing countries, is quite high, set at around
the 80th percentile of the income distribution (Waseem, 2018a). Income taxpayers
in the country are a richer segment of the population and therefore they and their
peer networks are extremely likely to be exposed to the disclosed information, be
it online or in other formats.
II.B Taxpayer Privileges and Honour Card Program
The secondprogramwe examine is the Taxpayer Privileges andHonourCard (TPHC)
scheme. The program was announced at the beginning of the tax year 2012, in July
2012. It acknowledges and grants special privileges to the top 100 taxpayers in each
of the following four categories: (a) wage-earners, (b) self-employed individuals,
(c) partnerships, and (d) corporations. The special privileges granted by the pro-
gram include: (1) automatic invitation to the Annual Excellence Awards hosted by
the Prime Minister; (2) automatic invitation to the state dinners held on Pakistan
Day (23rdMarch) and Independence Day (14th August); (3) fast-track immigration
through special counters (Figure A.I provides a photograph of such an immigra-
tion counter at the Lahore airport); (4) issuance of gratis passports; (5) access to
VIP lounges at Pakistani airports; and (6) an increased baggage allowance. These
privileges last one complete year, until the new set of recipients are announced.
The personal benefits of the program are conferred on the partner with the highest
capital contribution in the case of partnerships, and on the CEO in case of corpora-
tions.
Two features of the program need emphasizing. First, while the principal ele-
ment of the program is to honor and recognize top taxpayers,12 it provides some
material benefits as well. To the extent that these benefits are valued, the response
to the program would also reflect the willingness to pay of top taxpayers for these
benefits. Second, the program has some overlap with the public disclosure, as the
latter also identifies top taxpayers, albeit indirectly. In fact, most of the news items
that report on the public disclosure program also focus on who are the top tax-
12Addressing the first batch of the Honour Card recipients, the Prime Minister said that the “cer-
emony has been convened to acknowledge your services for the nation.”
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payers in the disclosed data. This media recognition, however, is indirect, usually
limited to the very top taxpayers (say top 10), and is not as salient or meaningful as
one offered by the TPHCprogram. But to the extent that the two programs overlap,
our estimates will capture the combined effects of the two.
II.C Pakistani Naming Conventions
Pakistani names generally do not conform to the standard Western syntax of given
name + middle name + surname. Instead, a typical Pakistani name consists of one
or more given names and a surname. The given names are usually derived from
Persian, Arabic, or Turkish, and it is quite common for people to have more than
one given name. If a person has two or more given names, the less common one
serves as the most-called name (the person is informally referred to by this given
name). For example, if Muhammad is one of the multiple given names, it is usu-
ally not the person’s most-called name, as being so common it does not serve as a
useful identifier. Unlike theWestern practice, surnames in Pakistan are usually not
fixed across generations. The most popular convention is to adopt the most-called
given name of father (husband) as the child’s (married woman’s) surname. As a
result, surnames vary even within the nuclear family (father/husband has a dif-
ferent surname). In cases where the surname does not vary within the family, it is
rarely unique. For example, virtually all people of Pashtun origin use Khan as their
surname.
Because of these conventions, many full names are widely shared in Pakistan.
Figure I illustrates this formally. We plot the distribution of full names contained in
the public disclosure data for the tax years 2012-2015. To construct the diagram, we
treat all English variants of anUrdu name as one. For example,Muhammad spelled
as Mohammad, Muhammed or Mohammed is treated as one name (to an Urdu
speaker, they would be indistinguishable). To show that adjusting these spelling
variations does not change our results materially, we provide the corresponding
raw distributions in Figure A.II (the details of our cleaning algorithm are presented
in Appendix A.1). A total of 526,425 unique names appear in the publicly disclosed
data during the four years. Of these, Muhammad Aslam is the most frequent, ap-
pearing 15,598 times. Because a single page of the directory on average consists of
60 rows, a given year’s directory contains about 65 (15,598/(4*60)) pages listing the
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nameMuhammadAslam alone. There are other such very frequent names. In fact,
nearly one-third of taxpayers share their full namewith at least 500 others. The dis-
tribution has a thick tail at the other end as well. Approximately 35% of taxpayers
have names that appear fewer than ten times in the four years of data; about 4%
appear only once, while 24% of names appear between 2-5 times.
As we note above, the directory carries no publicly-known identifier other than
the name. The wide variation in name frequency thus translates into a wide varia-
tion in the effective intensity of disclosure. Note that we do not expect, and do not
assume, that taxpayers know precisely how common their name is. However, per-
sons with very frequent names such as Muhammad Aslam would very likely have
come across numerous other people of the same name in their lives and would
have—through a conscious or subconscious process—formed a belief that their
name grants virtual anonymity to them. On the other hand, unique-named in-
dividuals would likely have a sense that any information with their name on it can
be linked to them directly. Once the public disclosure lists became available, it was
straightforward to acquire more concrete information about how common one’s
name is.
II.D Structure of Pakistani Legislature
Pakistan is a federation composed of a center and four provinces. The federal leg-
islature, called the Parliament, consists of two houses: the National Assembly and
Senate. The National Assembly has 342 seats, of which 272 are directly elected
through a first-past-the-post system. These directly-elected seats are divided be-
tween the provinces on the basis of their population in the latest census. The other
70 seats are reserved for women and religious minorities. The reserved seats are
filled through the proportional representation system based on the party position
in the national and four provincial assemblies. The Senate gives equal represen-
tation to all four provinces. It has 104 seats, all of which are filled through the
proportional representation system described above. Provincial legislatures are
unicameral, structured similarly to the National Assembly. Table A.I shows the
composition of the Pakistani legislature. Members of the national and four provin-
cial assemblies are elected for five years. The last four general electionswere held in
July 2018, May 2013, February 2008, andOctober 2002. Senators, on the other hand,
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are elected for six years in a three-year election cycle. There are no term limits on
any house membership, and MPs can continue standing for reelection as long as
they chose to.
III Conceptual Framework
III.A Social andPsychologicalMotivations inTaxCom-
pliance
Economists have traditionally modeled tax evasion as if it were a choice under un-
certainty (Allingham& Sandmo, 1972). Successful evasion provides additional dis-
posable income, but evasion also entails the risk that the evaded amount will be
recovered along with penalty in case of detection. Assume a taxpayer earns real
income z but reports z ≤ z with e ≡ z − z, paying a tax T ≡ τ(z − e). The taxpayer
perceives that evasionwill be detectedwith probability p, triggering a proportional
penalty of θ applied to the evaded income upon detection. The taxpayer chooses e
to maximize the expected utility of the gamble denoted by
(1) max
e
(1− p) .u [(1− τ)z + τe] + p.u [(1− τ)z − θe] .
In thismodel evasion is deterred solely by the fear of penalty. A risk-averse taxpayer
balances the disutility of income loss in the detected and penalized state against the
utility of extra income in the undetected state.
(2) u
′(cA)
u′(cNA)
=
(1− p) τ
pθ
,
where cA and cNA denote consumption in the detected and undetected states.
The model has been criticized for its lack of realism. Indeed, if one measures
the probability of detection and punishment by the average audit rate, one would
have to assume implausibly large levels of risk aversion to fit the model to data
about observed levels of evasion. Waseem (2018a), for example, estimates the com-
pliance rate of self-reported income in Pakistan to be around 50%,13 considerably
13Waseem (2018a) reports the evasion rate as a fraction of reported income. Here we convert the
13
larger than the 13% compliance rate predicted by the model for a plausible esti-
mate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ = 3).14 However, proxying the
detection probability by the fraction of returns audited by a tax authority ignores
that audit is not a scatter gun operation. Instead, tax authorities often use quite so-
phisticated selection models to target their audits. These models are helped by in-
formation reports from sources such as employers and financial institutions. Large
scale cross-matching allowed by these reports means that the detection probability
faced by taxpayers on income covered by third-party reports can be close to one
even if only a small percentage of tax returns are actually audited (Slemrod, 2007;
Kleven et al., 2011). Incorporating this feature of the environment improves the de-
terrence model’s fit considerably. In fact, it is able to explain the first-order pattern
of evasion across income fromvarious sources, notably that the noncompliance rate
of employee income is considerably lower than that for self-employment income,
estimated in the United States to be 1% and 63%, respectively.
The Allingham-Sandmo deterrence model does not, though, explain all aspects
of tax evasion, and does not take into account social and psychological factors.15
These factors can be divided into three classes. First, there are factors that reduce
utility in both states of the world. Guilt, for example, may cause psychological and
emotional distress to a tax cheat even if the act of cheating remains undetected. Sec-
ond are factors such as shame that reduce utility only if cheating gets detected (Er-
ard & Feinstein, 1994). And, third, there are behavioral biases whereby the detec-
tion probability and penalty are systematically mis-estimated by taxpayers (Scholz
& Pinney, 1995; Chetty, 2009). The simplest manner in which these factors can be
incorporated into the model is to rewrite the maximization problem as follows:
(3) max
e
(1− ϕρ) .u [(1− τ)z + τe− ge] + ϕρ.u [(1− τ)z − θe− ge− se] .
Here, g (denoting guilt) and s (denoting shame) represent the moral costs of eva-
sion. For simplicity, we introduce these costs as proportional terms, but the results
are robust to plausible functional forms. We decompose the detection probability
estimate into a fraction of real income to make it comparable with the simulations of the Allingham
& Sandmo Model.
14See the calibrations in Alm et al. (1992) and related discussion in Luttmer & Singhal (2014).
15For example, in an influential survey of the tax compliance literature, Andreoni et al. (1998)
write that “factors such as a moral obligation to be truthful, or the social consequences of being a
known cheater, may add further enforcement incentives that are not accounted for in our models.”
14
perceived by the agent p into two parts: ρ represents the real probability of detec-
tion and ϕ the factor by which the real detection probability is mis-estimated. The
FOC of the extended model is:
(4) u
′(cA)
u′(cNA)
=
(1− ϕρ) (τ − g)
ϕρ (θ + g + s)
.
Intuitively, s enters the problem in a similar way as the pecuniary penalty θ; on
the other hand, g acts like a negative tax rate in the undetected state—reducing the
benefit of evasion—and like a penalty in the audited state. The composite detection
probability ϕρ now reflects the behavioral biases ϕ. The comparative statics of the
problem are straightforward. Evasion decreases with ϕ, ρ, g, and s as long as the
marginal utility of consumption is diminishing (risk aversion).16
The public disclosure programwe examine potentially affects each of these four
parameters. By facilitatingwhistle-blowing, it arguably raises both the real andper-
ceived likelihood of detection. It may also intensify the guilt and shame felt by tax
cheats, especially if reported income does not match consumption or wealth ob-
served by peers. Pakistan, however, did not have a formal whistleblowing regime
for most of the period we study. Whistleblowing was incorporated into the Pak-
istani tax code in July 2015 and the necessary rules for this purpose were issued on
May 5, 2016. While we cannot rule out informal whistleblowing, the absence of a
formal whistleblowing regime in our setting considerably weakens the possibility
that the real detection probability ρ rises as a result of the disclosure. We therefore
believe that any response arising out of the disclosure would largely reflect moral
costs (g and s) and the behavioral bias (ϕ). These factors reinforce each other. We,
therefore, expect the public disclosure to reduce evasion and increase tax payments.
The other programwe study (TPHC)promotes compliance aswell. Social recog-
nition of top taxpayers can induce pride and sense of accomplishment. Individu-
als may also treat taxation as a position (Veblen) good, deriving utility from being
seen as one of the richest in the country (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000).17 The goodwill
offered by the TPHC program can be monetized too. Individuals and firms may
advertise their status as a top taxpayer to gain more consumers and sales. Due to
these mechanisms, the costs of evasion jump up at the eligibility cutoff of the pro-
16See Slemrod & Yitzhaki (2002) for details.
17It has been found that consuming goods associated with wealth provides utility to individuals
even if the consumption remains invisible to others (Bursztyn et al., 2018).
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gram. The resulting notch will induce taxpayers to locate on the eligible side of the
cutoff, increasing the tax paid by agents close to the cutoff. Working in the opposite
direction, some taxpayers may place negative value on the attention the program
provides.
III.B Empirical Strategy
We use difference-in-differences research designs to estimate the effects of the two
programs on tax compliance. These designs are explained in greater detail below.
III.B.1 Public Disclosure Program
The public disclosure program was rolled out nationally, all at once. Therefore,
the principal identification challenge in estimating its effects is to control for any
trends or shocks that might affect tax reporting at the aggregate level and may co-
incide with the program. We achieve this by exploiting the variation in exposure to
the program caused by the degree of uniqueness of a taxpayer’s name. We define
Name Frequency as the number of times a full name appears in the four years of
the disclosed data. For example, the Name Frequency of the most frequent name
in the data—Muhammad Aslam—is 15,598. Taking advantage of the observable
differences in program intensity across taxpayers with different Name Frequency,
we estimate regressions of the form
(5) log TaxPaidit = αi + β treati × aftert + λt + uit,
where αi and λt are individual and year fixed effects, aftert is a dummy indicating
2012 or a later year, and treati is an indicator of the Name Frequency of individual
i. We experiment with different Name Frequency cutoffs in our empirical speci-
fications. The difference-in-differences (DD) coefficient of interest β captures the
differential effect of the program, denoting the average additional tax paid in the
post-programyears by individualswith relatively lowName Frequency. In this and
all subsequent specifications, we cluster standard errors at the individual level, the
most aggregate level feasible in our setting (Abadie et al., 2017; Bertrand et al., 2004).
For β to have a causal interpretation, it must be shown that the interaction vari-
able and the error terms are uncorrelated. Our treatment variable captures how
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unique a taxpayer’s name is. But names are not randomly assigned. Instead, they
are chosen by parents, perhaps with the help of close relatives and friends. Any
measure of name uniqueness, therefore, could be correlated with parental traits
such as income, education, and ethnicity. To control for such correlations, we al-
ways include individual fixed effects in our regressions. The parental traits, there-
fore, would influence our estimates only if their effect changes over time, in partic-
ular in 2012.
We offer three pieces of evidence to rule out this concern. First, exploiting the
panel nature of data we show that there were no systematic differences between
the compared groups in terms of their tax payments in the pre-program years. We
show this through the following event-study regressions
(6) log TaxPaidit = αi +
2015∑
j=2007
γj treati × 1.(year=j)t + λt + uit.
The coefficients γjs here capture the average difference in tax payment between the
two groups in year j relative to the reference year 2006. For a variety of definitions
of treatment, we show that the estimated γjs remain trivial/insignificant in the pre-
program years but become large and significant in the post-program years. While
validating our empirical strategy, these results do not expressly rule out a contem-
poraneousmacro event that affects the tax payments ofmore-uniquely-named indi-
viduals. Note that inmost difference-in-differences setups this assumption remains
untested and is presumed satisfied if the preexisting trends are parallel. But in our
setting we can go one step further than the parallel-trends assumption to rule out
this possibility more directly. As we note above, MPs in Pakistan are prominent
in their communities and their constituencies are listed in the directory. The effec-
tiveness of the disclosure is therefore plausibly independent of how conspicuous
or obscure their name is. We show that β remains statistically indistinguishable
from zero when equation (5) is estimated on the sample of MPs only. This result
is consistent with our assertion that the estimated coefficient of interest is driven
by the causal impact of disclosure, rather than by any residual correlation between
the name and tax payment. In our final test, we estimate equation (5) on the pre-
program periods only (2006-2011), pretending as if the program occurred in 2010
rather than the actual date of 2012. These placebo regressions always return triv-
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ial/statistically insignificant coefficients on the interaction term of interest.
The response to the public disclosure program is principally driven by three
forces: shame, guilt, and fear of detection. Of these, guilt is entirely internal to a
person. A tax cheat may feel cognitive or emotional distress even if the act of cheat-
ing is never exposed. The disclosure program can intensify these feelings. A tax
cheat may now experience greater disutility from guilt because they can compare
their tax payments to their peers. Given that guilt is independent of the ease with
which an individual can be identified in the disclosed records (on average the con-
trol group experiences the same level of guilt as the treatment group), our estimates
do not capture the response driven by it. In this sense, our estimates represent a
lower bound on the total effect of the disclosure.
Our primary population of interest are the self-employed individuals. The Pak-
istani tax code and our administrative data defines a taxpayer as self-employed if
their salary income does not exceed 50% of their taxable income. Self-employment
income, being self-reported andnot subject to substantial cross-checkingwith third-
party information reports, is the most amenable to manipulation. Tax compliance
studies from around the globe show that the incidence and extent of noncompli-
ance is the highest for the self-employed (see for example Slemrod, Forthcoming
and Waseem, 2018a). If the public disclosure program curtails tax evasion, the ef-
fect would be the strongest for this section of the population. Our secondary pop-
ulation of interest are MPs. In regressions relating to them, the dummy variable
treati indicates an individual who has been an MP in the 2013-2018 election cy-
cle of Pakistan. Control groups in these regressions are either all individuals or
individuals with relatively common names.
III.C TPHC Program
The TPHC program recognizes and rewards the top 100 taxpaying corporations,
partnerships, self-employed individuals, and wage-earners. If the incentives and
recognition offered by the program are valued, taxpayers ranked just below 100
would attempt to get into the top 100 in the next year and taxpayers just above the
cutoff would attempt to stay there. The discontinuous treatment would thus cause
a spike in the growth of tax paid from year t to t + 1 by taxpayers ranked around
the eligibility cutoff of the program in year t. We test this hypothesis by estimating
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regressions of the following sort:
(7) ∆log TaxPaidit = α + β treati × aftert + λt + uit,
where λt are the year fixed effects and treati is a dummy indicating that taxpayer i
was ranked in a window around the cutoff in year t. We begin with a narrow win-
dow around the cutoff and gradually widen it to determine whether, as expected,
the effects of the program are concentrated close to the cutoff. The TPHC program
was announced before the beginning of the tax year 2012. To respond to the pro-
gram, however, the taxpayers needed to know their rank. We assume this was not
possible before the publication of the first set of public disclosure data. For this
reason, we consider 2013 as the first post-program year. We estimate equation (7)
on a sample of the top 1000 taxpayers in each of the four categories. The princi-
pal identification concern in this setting is that income, and therefore tax liability,
of top taxpayers may be trending differently than others for non-program reasons
such as rising inequality. We rule out this concern through non-parametric event
studies and placebo falsification exercises.
III.D Data
We use data from three different sources for our empirical analysis. First, we access
the public disclosure data from the FBR’s website. As we note above, this data set
contains the name, numerical identifier, and tax paid by every taxpayer in Pakistan
for the tax years 2012-2015. The data set for MPs includes the additional identifier
of the constituency number. Second, we utilize administrative tax return data from
the FBR. We have access to this data for the tax years 2006 to 2012 only (the FBR
stopped providing researchers access to the data after that). The administrative
data contains all the line items in the tax return form. It also includes a few tax-
payer characteristics such as name, tax identifier, type (corporation, partnership,
self-employed, wage-earner), and date of registration. Combining the two sources
of data, we are able to construct a panel of all taxpayers in Pakistan from 2006 to
2015.
Pakistan runs an elaborate system of what is called tax withholding. A tax re-
mittance responsibility is triggered by a number of transactions including wage
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payments. For some of such transactions (not including, e.g., employer withhold-
ing), the withheld tax is treated as the final discharge of liability. For example,
income tax at the rate of 1% of the value is owed on all export transactions. The re-
mittance is due at the time the payment is received and the withheld tax is deemed
as the final discharge of liability: the taxpayer does not include income from the
transaction in computing taxable income, nor is he or she allowed any refund or
credit for the withheld tax. Tax payments reported in the disclosure data are the
sum of the tax paid on taxable income and the tax paid at source (called “final tax
paid” in the Pakistani tax code). We observe both these types of tax paid in the
administrative data, and are thus able to construct a consistently-defined variable
that captures tax payment of each taxpayer in all years included in the panel.
Table II presents summary statistics of our sample of self-employed individuals.
Treatment group comprises individuals whose Name Frequency does not exceed
40. We first compare five moments of the distributions of taxable income, tax paid
on taxable income, and tax paid at source for the two pre-program years across the
treatment and control samples. In subsequent rows, we compare the mean of nine
taxpayer traits across the two groups. Traits in rows 4-6 capture intensity of the
program. Since the program was rolled out electronically, taxpayers in cities with
greater internet access were more exposed to it. On the other hand, taxpayers with
multiple businesses or with business in a city different from the city of residence
were less exposed as linking the disclosed tax to the observed lifestyle is harder
in such situations. Rows 7-9 of the table explore variation in risk aversion across
the two groups. Early filers are expected to be more and males and young less
risk averse than their counterparts (Borghans et al., 2009; Albert & Duffy, 2012).
And finally, rows 10-12 compare the knowledge of and responsiveness to taxation
among the two groups.
Rows 1-3 of the table show that the two groups are fairly evenly distributed
across the taxable income and the two tax-paid distributions. But, as expected, tax-
payers with more unique names are different from the others along a few dimen-
sions. For example, they are more likely to reside in a major city and less likely to
be male or old. In our empirical strategy, these fixed traits are absorbed by the indi-
vidual fixed effects. Table III explores if conditioning on these fixed effects removes
the correlation between the treatment and the outcome of interest. We estimate a
triple-difference version of model (5) on the pre-program years (2006-2011) only,
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pretending 2010-11 to be the post-program years. Clearly, the outcome is not cor-
related with the name-uniqueness once the individual fixed effects are included in
the model. None of the triple-interaction coefficients in the nine specifications is
significant at the conventional level in either the complete or the balanced panel
sample.
For our analysis of MPs’ behavioral responses, we collect data on all elections
held during the 2013-2018 election cycle of Pakistan. This data set include variables
such as the date of election, type of constituency (reserved or directly contested),
total votes cast, votes obtained, and party affiliations. We collect this data from the
websites of the Election Commission of Pakistan, National Assembly, Senate, and
the four Provincial Assemblies of the country.
IV Effects of the Public Disclosure Program
Wefirst report the effects of the programon the general population of self-employed
taxpayers and later for MPs.
IV.A All Taxpayers
IV.A.1 Intensive Margin
Event Study—Figure II shows the results from the estimation of equation (6). We
restrict the sample to a balanced panel of self-employed individuals who file in ev-
ery year from 2006 to 2015. The figure plots the estimated values of the γjs from
the equation. Panels A-D feature four different definitions of treatment as indi-
cated in the title of the panel. The first decile, first quartile, median, third quartile,
and top decile of the Name Frequency distribution are 4, 6, 76, 1853, and 6091, re-
spectively. Taxpayers in the first decile of the distribution, therefore, have literally
unique names: their name appears 4 times in 4 years of data. To accentuate the
comparison, we drop the middle part of the distribution in Panels C-D: second and
third quartiles in Panel C and deciles 2-9 in Panel D. The results strongly support
our empirical strategy. There are almost no pre-existing differences between the
compared groups in terms of tax payments: for all the definitions of treatment, the
γjs are indistinguishable from zero for at least four of the five pre-program years.
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The tax payments of the two groups diverge exactly from the time the program
takes effect. This divergence is sharp and persistent. It is also larger, the larger is
the difference in exposure to the program. For example, the relative differences in
Panel D (bottom vs. top decile) are almost double those in Panel B (below vs. above
median).
All of the specifications show evidence of a dip in the treatment effect in 2013,
the second year of the program. Although we cannot test it formally, we believe
that the dip results from a mass media campaign launched by the Pakistani tax
administration in 2014 to increase voluntary tax compliance in the country. The
campaign began in mid-September and continued till October 31st, shortly before
the deadline to file the 2013 tax return (Cyan et al. 2017).18 During the campaign,
the administration took out advertisements in television, radio, and newspapers
and sent out mobile phone text messages telling prospective taxpayers how easy it
was to file taxes and how important doing so was for national development. We
feel that this campaign could conceivably have nudged even the control group tax-
payers to increase their tax payments, reducing the gap between the two groups.
No campaign of comparable intensity was launched in any other tax year.
Regression Results—Table IV reports the regression results. We estimate equation
(5) on the sample of self-employed individuals using four different definitions of
treatment. To keep the control group fixed across all specifications, columns (1)-
(6) drop taxpayers whose Name Frequency falls between the upper bound of the
treatment and 40. All specifications include individual fixed effects and allow an
unrestricted variance-covariance structure at the individual level (Bertrand et al.,
2004).
Note that the public disclosure program can spur the entry of new taxpayers.
If such entry is correlated with our measure of exposure to the program, the post-
program sample would have a different composition than the pre-program one.
Although the individual fixed effects mitigate this concern, we rule it out even fur-
ther by estimating each specification on the balanced panel sample as well (even-
numbered columns). Panel B provides a direct test of the validity of the research
design, estimating each specification on the pre-program periods 2006-2011 only.
We define the last two years in these placebo regressions as the post-program years.
18The tax year 2013 in our paper refers to the year that runs from July 2013 to June 2014. Cyan
et al. (2017) refer to it as the tax year 2014 in their paper.
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The details of the regression results affirm the visual evidence presented above.
The public disclosure induces individuals with relatively unique names to report
on average around 9 log points more tax liability than others. This effect is statis-
tically significant and remarkably stable across all specifications. As expected, it
drops slightly as we widen the treatment window, allowing less distinctly named
individuals to enter the treatment window, a finding we explore further in the next
set of results. Panel B provides evidence that validates the empirical strategy, show-
ing that the placebo coefficient capturing any pre-existing trends in tax payments
across the compared groups is trivial/insignificant in all specifications. This in-
dicates that leveraging the variation in exposure to the program based on name
uniqueness indeed isolates the treatment effect of the program.
The evidence we have presented so far is consistent with our premise that the
program intensity varies proportionally with the uniqueness of a person’s name.
Table V explores this idea further. We now use a more continuous definition of
treatment instead of a dichotomous one, exploring how the response varies across
the Name Frequency distribution. The placebo specifications in columns (3)-(4) il-
lustrate that no systematic relationship existed between the tax payment and name
of an individual before the program. However, a strong relationship appears af-
ter the program (columns 1-2), with self-employed taxpayers having more distinct
names remitting significantly more tax. This effect is strongest at the left tail of the
distribution, containing the most unique names. It declines monotonically as we
move rightward and becomes indistinguishable from zero as the Name Frequency
approaches 300. As we note above, we do not presume that taxpayers have a pre-
cise, objective idea of how common their name is. But life experiences of persons
with very common name such as Muhammad Aslam would have instilled subjec-
tive beliefs that their name affords virtual anonymity to them. The results in Table
V show that this threshold is apparently reached at about 300. Persons with such
frequent names behave as if they are aware of the objective reality that linking the
disclosed information to them through their name is virtually impossible.
In another check on our empirical strategy, we now show that no significant as-
sociation exists between the name and tax payment for the sample of taxpayerswho
are (i) well-known and (ii) identified in the disclosed records through additional,
publicly-known identifiers. Table A.II presents the results. We replicate Table IV,
estimating equation (5) on the sample of MPs only. Because MPs fulfill conditions
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(i) and (ii), we do not expect the regressions to return significant DD coefficients.
Reassuringly, the results are consistentwith our expectations: the uniqueness of the
name of an MP is not associated with a significantly higher or lower tax payment
after the program in any of the eight specifications.
Our baseline specification defines Name Frequency as the number of times a
full name appears in the four years of disclosed data (2012-2015). There is a concern
that this definitionmay conflate the true populationmeasure of the uniqueness of a
name with the return filing behavior. For example, the definition assigns the same
value to a full name appearing four times in a single year or once every post-reform
year. While this concern ismitigated by the fact that the distribution of names in our
sample is extremely stable across years (see Figure I-B), we address it more directly
in Table A.III. We now define Name Frequency as 4 × the number of times a full
name appears in a given year’s data. We multiply the number of occurrences of
a full name in a given year’s data by four to make this alternative definition more
compatible with the one in our baseline specification. Unsurprisingly, we obtain
very similar results.
Table A.IV shows the results of our final robustness check. We estimate equa-
tion (5) restricting the sample to self-employed taxpayers whose taxable income for
the baseline year (2011) falls in the window indicated in the heading of the col-
umn. This check addresses the potential concern that taxpayers with common and
uncommon names might be located in different areas of the income distribution
and thus would be subject to different shocks. We have already shown in Table
II that this is not the case, and that our treatment and control taxpayers are dis-
tributed fairly evenly across the taxable income distribution. The results in Table
A.IV confirm this. Even when taxpayers having baseline income within a window
of PKR 100k are compared, the tax paid by unique-named taxpayers goes up signif-
icantly after the program relative to the others, although no such difference existed
prior to the program (see the placebo exercise in Panel B of the table). Another
important finding shown in the table is that the response declines as we move up
the taxable income distribution, becoming insignificant as the income approaches
PKR 400k. This finding is consistent with the recent theoretical literature that ar-
gues that large/high-income taxpayers have far less ability to engage in tax evasion
(see Gordon & Li, 2009; Kopczuk & Slemrod, 2006; Kleven et al., 2016).19
19Existing empirical results are also consistent with these theoretical models. Waseem (2018a), for
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Heterogeneity—Table A.V estimates a triple-difference version of model (5), explor-
ing how the response varies across self-employed taxpayers with the nine traits
listed in Table II. The first three of these traits, as we mention above, capture pro-
gram intensity. The results are consistent with our expectations. Major-city resi-
dents with greater access to the internet and hence to the disclosed data respond
more aggressively; multiple businesses owners, for whom there is greater ambigu-
ity about their earnings, respond less aggressively. We do not observe either the
residence or business city for roughly one-third of the population and very likely
for this reason the triple-interaction coefficient in the second column, although of
the expected sign, is insignificant. The next three columns of the table explore if
the response varies with the likely correlates of the degree of risk aversion of a
taxpayer.20 The results of this exercise are inconclusive: all the triple-interaction
coefficients are of the expected sign but insignificant. The last three columns of the
table look for any variation in response across taxpayers with a varying degree of
knowledge of or attention to the tax system or the ability to game the tax system.
We find no differential response along these margins.
IV.A.2 Extensive Margin
Event Study—Public disclosure can also encourage tax filing by individuals with
less common names. To probe this, we first present visual evidence. Figure III plots
the log of number of self-employed filers in the treatment and control groups from
year 2006 to 2015. We normalize the outcome variable in both groups to 1 in 2006
and track its evolution in the later years. As earlier, we consider four definitions of
treatment indicated in the heading of each panel. To make the comparison more
stark, we drop the middle portion of the distribution in Panels C-D as we did in
Figure II. Plots show that the program did result in more filing by less-common-
named taxpayers. This effect is qualitatively very similar to the intensive margin
effect, although it is smaller in magnitude. The next section formalizes this result
example, finds that the evasion rate for the self-employed in Pakistan is around 74% at the bottom of
the taxable income distribution but reduces to 6% as the income approaches PKR 350k. Because the
response to the public disclosure program captures a reduction in tax evasion, it is not surprising
that it becomes insignificant at the higher income levels.
20There is some evidence in literature that men and young are less risk-averse than their counter-
parts (Borghans et al., 2009; Albert & Duffy, 2012). Similarly, individuals who habitually file their
tax returns earlier than others are expected to be more risk averse.
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using the regression framework.
Regression Results—Table VI reports the results from the following regressions
(8) log Ngt = α + β treatg + γ treatg × aftert + λt + ugt,
whereNgt is the log number of filers of group g ∈ {treat, control} in year t. Columns
(1)-(4) are constructed similarly to the corresponding columns of Table IV, while
columns (5)-(7) correspond to the three specifications in Figure IIIB-D. Panel B of
the table conducts a placebo exercise, where we estimate the above equation on the
pre-program periods only, treating 2010-11 as the two post-program years. Con-
sistent with the visual evidence, none of these placebo coefficients is significant at
the conventional level, illustrating that tax filing was evolving similarly in the com-
pared groups. After the program, however, the tax filing of less-common-named
taxpayers goes up relative to the more-common-named taxpayers. The DD coeffi-
cient is statistically different from zero in all specifications, showing that the pro-
gram increased filing by around 1-2%.
IV.B MPs
We now turn our attention toMPs. For this group a disclosure suggesting noncom-
pliance can be particularly stigmatic and damaging. If constituents negatively view
suspiciously low tax payments and non-filing, it could influence an MP’s election
probability in addition to triggering mechanisms such as guilt, shame, and fear of
detection. A priori, therefore, the program should have a stronger pro-compliance
effect on them.
Intensive Margin Response—Table VII estimates the effect of the public disclosure
on the tax liability reported by MPs. We use two control groups: all non-MP tax-
payers in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6), and common-named, non-MP taxpayers in
other columns. Each specification has its own merits. The first control group in-
cludes taxpayers who are themselves affected by the program. The specification
therefore isolates the additional response of MPs, i.e. their response relative to the
if-they-were-ordinary-taxpayers counterfactual. This additional response reflects
that MPs are perhaps more sensitive to the disclosure and that the disclosed in-
formation is more salient for them. The second control group excludes taxpayers
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whose Name Frequency exceeds 300. These taxpayers, as shown in Table V, en-
joy effective anonymity in the disclosure and are therefore less responsive to it.
The specification accordingly captures MPs response relative to the no-effective-
disclosure counterfactual.
All MPs receive a salary from the government of Pakistan in an amount that
is fixed by the relevant legislature.21 In addition to this, MPs may also receive in-
come from businesses they own or assets they hold. We expect the effects of the
program to be concentrated on this part of income. To capture this, we run par-
allel regressions for each specification where we restrict the sample to individuals
whose non-salary incomes constitutes more than 50% of their taxable income.
The results show that the program had a far stronger compliance effect on MPs
than on non-MPs. Their tax payments went up on average by 40 log points relative
to the first control group and by 50 log points relative to the second. Consistent
with our expectations, this response is primarily driven by the non-salary income.
The estimates in even-numbered columns (which focus on non-salary income) are
nearly double those in the odd-numbered columns.22
Note that the placebo regressions return statistically significant coefficients in
three out of eight specifications. We suspect that this is due mainly to the lack of
power we face in these specifications. The 2013-2018 Pakistani legislature had 1174
members. Only one-third of these were filing tax returns prior to the program.
This leads to small treatment samples in our regressions, especially when we do
not work with the complete panel.23 Another plausible reason for this are the pre-
program effects. MPs in our sample won their seats in the election of May 2013.
As a requirement of running for office, they had to report the tax paid by them
during the tax year 2011 to the Election Commission of Pakistan. They also almost
21The salary was fixed initially by the The Members of Parliament (Salaries and Allowances) Act,
1974. It is revised from time to time using the procedure laid down in the statute.
22One other event that occurred during our sample period and could affect the tax payments of
MPs was the release of the Panama Papers in April 2016. In these papers, close family members
of the sitting Prime Minister were named as owners of offshore companies. Although no other
MP was named, the release could have led to increased tax payments by MPs fearing greater tax
scrutiny. The tax directories for the years 2014 and 2015 were published after the release of the
Panama Papers. We, however, do not see any evidence of a jump in the DD coefficients for these
years, suggesting that the effect of the papers, if any, was not large (see Figure IV).
23One other consequence of the change in the composition of the sample in 2012 (see Figure V) is
that the balanced-panel estimates in column (5) and (7) are larger than the corresponding complete
panel estimates. The balanced-panel estimates here capture the average response of MPs who were
filing their tax returns even in the pre-program years.
27
certainly knew that their tax declarationwould receive increased attention from the
media due to the ongoing investigation of the CIRP (as discussed in section II.A).
They thereforemight have remitted higher tax for the year 2011 to create a favorable
impression on their constituents. We find some evidence of this in the event study
diagrams displayed in Figure IV. The DD coefficient for 2011 is significantly higher
than the pre-program trend in specifications with the restricted samples.
Table A.VI explores heterogeneity in MPs’ response across five traits. Table
A.VII reports the results from parallel regressions run on balanced panel samples,
and Table A.VIII from placebo regressions run on the pre-program periods only.
MPs belonging to the ruling party, serving the federal legislature, facing tight races,
and holding federal cabinet positions are expected to be more sensitive to the dis-
closure than others. But the evidence on this point is not conclusive: only one of
the four triple-interaction terms—federal minister—is statistically significant; the
placebo regression, however, shows that the tax liability of this group of MPs was
growing faster than others even before the disclosure program. MPs in our sample
were elected in May 2013. Their response to the disclosure therefore potentially
conflates the program effect with the effect of becoming an MP (income and hence
tax liability of an MP may grow faster than others). To rule out this concern, we
examine any differential response by individuals who were also MPs in the pre-
vious parliament. The triple-interaction coefficient in column (6) is negative but
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Extensive Margin Response—One advantage we have in analyzing MPs’ response
that we did not have with all taxpayers is that we know the population of MPs who
should be filing, which allows us to measure the filing rate. The results of this in-
vestigation are shown in Figure V. It illustrates that only around 30% of MPs were
filing their returns prior to the program. Following the program, the filing rate in-
creased to almost 100% in 2012, declining a little thereafter to the 85-90%mark. The
corresponding LPM regressions, reported in Table A.IX, show that the filing rate
on average increased by nearly 60 percentage points. The increase was significantly
higher for MPs in more competitive races and lower for federal legislators and cab-
inet members; but these differences mostly reflect differences in the pre-treatment
levels, as post-treatment all of the filing rates are very close to 100%.
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V Effects of the TPHC Program
Figure VI provides non-parametric evidence on the effects of the TPHC program.
The sample for this diagram includes corporations, partnerships, self-employed
and wage-earning taxpayers. We group taxpayers into 20-rank bins on the basis
of their rank in year t. The upper bound of a bin is included in the bin so that,
for example, the bin denoted by 40 in the horizontal axis includes the taxpayers
ranked between 21 and 40 in each of the four categories. We then plot the average
log change in tax paid from year t to t + 1 in the bin. To increase the power of
our analysis, we take the averages over three-year periods in Panel A and over the
entire pre- and post-program periods in Panel B. Because we are plotting changes
rather than levels, 2012 is the first post-programyear in this analysis. If the program
influences behavior, the post-program curves should be significantly higher than
the pre-program ones around the cutoff of 100. The evidence in the diagram is
consistent with this a priori reasoning. It suggests that at least some taxpayers near
the eligibility cutoff of the program increase their tax payments in order to receive
or continue to receive the benefits of the program.
Table VIII formalizes this analysis. We estimate equation (7) on a sample of the
top 1000 taxpayers in each of the four categories. We define taxpayers in a window
around the eligibility cutoff of the program as treated, and look for any differential
growth in tax liability reported by them relative to the other taxpayers. In line with
the visual evidence, the growth rate does spike up around the cutoff. For example,
the DD coefficient in the first column shows that compared to the others, the yearly
growth in tax liability reported by the 81-120 ranked taxpayers was on average 17
log points higher in the post-program years than it was in the pre-program years.
The coefficient declines slightly as we widen the window, suggesting that the effect
is stronger closer to the cutoff.
To establish that our DD coefficient captures the causal effect of the program,
we need to ensure that it is not driven by any differential trends resulting from, for
example, rising inequality at the top. We take three steps to achieve this. First, we
re-estimate each specification in the table by adding a treat×1.(year ∈ {2010, 2011})
interaction term into it. The coefficient on the term loosely captures any differ-
ences in the pre-existing trends across the compared groups. It is small and sta-
tistically insignificant in all the specifications. Second, we estimate our model on
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the pre-program period only (2006-2011), pretending that the program occurred
in 2010. These placebo regressions, shown in Panel B, always return insignificant
coefficients. Finally, we look for the effect of the program on very similar taxpay-
ers unaffected by it. Table A.X conducts this exercise. The treatment window now
contains taxpayers who are relatively far away from the eligibility cutoff of the pro-
gram, on whose behavior we expect the program to have no influence. The results
confirm this. None of the coefficients in the table is distinguishable from zero at
the conventional level.
To increase the power of our analysis, we have so far combined all four cate-
gories of taxpayers in our estimation samples. Table A.XI decomposes the aggre-
gate response. We now estimate our baseline specification (7) separately on the
sample of top 1000 taxpayers of each of the four categories. The results show that
the aggregate effect we report above is driven almost entirely by the behavior of
corporations. Compared to the large and statistically significant effect on corpora-
tions, the program’s effect on the other three categories of taxpayers is not different
from zero.
These heterogeneous findings are perhaps not surprising. Of the four taxpayer
types, corporations are perhaps in the best position to monetize the goodwill of-
fered by the program. They can build their brands by advertising their status as
one of the top taxpayers, translating the social recognition into higher sales and
profits. Table A.XII evaluates this explanation by exploring response heterogene-
ity across firms. Strikingly, firms that are likely to be more sensitive to public
opinion—public-limited firms24 and firms engaged in consumer sectors such as
banking, food, and textile—respond aggressively to the program. In contrast, firms
who are foreign-owned, face inelastic demand (pharma), or do not operate in the
consumer sector (construction) seem unaffected. Although not all of the estimated
interaction terms are statistically significant, the overall pattern is consistent with
both our expectations and similar evidence from other contexts showing that big
firms, in particular those in the consumer sector, are relatively more sensitive to
their public image, especially in issues involving social responsibility and taxes (see
for exampleHanlon&Slemrod, 2009; Bénabou&Tirole, 2010; Graham et al., 2013).25
24Public limited firms are corporationswhose shares can be bought and sold by the general public
through the stock exchange. They are therefore more likely to care about their public image than
private limited firms whose shares are not available to public.
25One complementary mechanism driving the higher response by corporations could be the fol-
30
VI Did theTwoProgramsAffect SocialNorms?
Arguably one motivation of the government in introducing the public disclosure
and TPHCprogramswas to instill and strengthen a culture of compliance, inculcat-
ing tax payment as a social virtue and tax evasion as a vice. We have shown above
that the two programs influenced private behavior substantially. In this section
we look at whether part of the response was due to a shift in social norms toward
compliance.
VI.A Heterogeneous Social Pressure to Comply
To examine this question, we first exploit spatial heterogeneity in the public disclo-
sure response, exploring if the dynamics of the response varies acrossmore and less
compliant neighborhoods. Neighborhood here denotes the subdistrict a taxpayer
resides in. There are 1,145 subdistricts in our data, with a typical subdistrict con-
taining 470 taxpayers. We define a compliant neighborhood in two different ways.
First, columns (1)-(4) of Table IX treat a neighborhood with an above-median pro-
portion of less-common-named wage earners as compliant. Because wage income
is third-party reported, the extent of evasion on this type of income is severely con-
strained.26 Neighborhoods with a large proportion of less-common-named wage-
earners contain a large proportion of recognizably compliant taxpayers, and there-
fore arguably create stronger social pressure for compliance. In an alternative for-
mulation, columns (5)-(8) of the table treat neighborhoods with an above-median
proportion of top,27 less-common-named self-employed as compliant.
Column (1) of the table shows that the compliant neighborhoods were quite
similar to the others initially, but over time tax payments there started trending
upwards. Column (2) demonstrates that this result is not driven by the neighbor-
hoods in threemajor cities of the country, where the public disclosure responsewas
lowing. As we note above, personal benefits of the program such as fast-track immigration are
conferred on the CEO of the corporation. The burden of higher tax payments, on the other hand,
falls on shareholders. If the oversight by the board of governors is weak, the agency problem can
also result in a situation where the CEOs benefit at the cost of shareholders.
26Waseem (2018a) estimates that the evasion of wage income in Pakistan is less than 1% of the
reported income. This estimate is in line with the similar estimates from other countries (Slemrod,
Forthcoming).
27We define top taxpayer as someone who is in the top quartile of the tax liability distribution in
the baseline year i.e. 2012. The rest of the taxpayers are treated as bottom taxpayers.
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stronger anyway (see column 1 of Table A.V). Columns (3)-(4) decompose the ag-
gregate effect into two, looking at the behavior of top and bottom taxpayers within
each neighborhood separately. The decomposition suggests that compliance in-
deed has an infectious element to it: tax payments of bottom taxpayers in more
compliant neighborhoods increase over time, while those of top taxpayers stay al-
most the same. We see a similar catch-up pattern of response for our alternative
definition of compliant neighborhood in columns (5)-(8).
VI.B Public Disclosure and Electoral Success
Recall that the public disclosure program was precipitated by the revelation that
the country’s political elites were delinquent in fulfilling their tax obligations. We
next explore how the electorate reacted to the tax histories of politicians, which be-
came public information as a result of the program. Pakistan had a general election
in July 2018 in which 664 of the 915 directly-elected MPs in our sample took part.
Nearly one-half of theseMPs succeeded in retaining their seats. Table X investigates
if this electoral success is associated with the disclosed tax payments. We regress
an indicator that an MP wins the 2018 election on her tax payments as disclosed
through the directories of 2012-2015. The sample includes only the directly-elected
MPs and we normalize the RHS variable by its standard deviation. The results
show that electoral success is indeed strongly positively associated with the level
of tax payments (columns 1-7), although not with the change (column 8). The coef-
ficient in column (1), for example, shows that paying one standard deviation higher
tax in 2012 is associated with a roughly six percentage points higher probability of
winning the 2018 election. This strong positive correlation persists if, instead of
2012, later years’ tax payments or the maximum, minimum, or sum of the tax pay-
ments are used as regressors (columns 2-7). Because all the post-2012 tax payments
are of a similar level (see Figures IV and V), it is not surprising that the coefficient
on the change variable is smaller and insignificant (column 8).28
The association documented above could simply reflect heterogeneity in MP
characteristics (richer MPs pay more tax and are more likely to win), program in-
tensity (disclosure was more salient for federal and ruling party MPs), or electoral
28One other manifestation of this result is that if we put tax paid in each year from 2012 to 2015
as four separate regressors the coefficient on only one of the regressors is statistically different from
zero.
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swing. Table XI seeks to control for these potential confounders by introducing four
sets of covariates into the baseline specification. The results show that the correla-
tion remains strong even if we compare MPs belonging to the same political party,
serving the same legislature, and having similar electoral performance in the 2013
election. Table A.XIII explores the influence of tax payments on five other electoral
outcomes. While the success-related outcomes are all positively correlatedwith the
disclosed tax payments (columns 1-3), non-success ones are not (columns 4-5). Fi-
nally, Table A.XIV investigates if reporting zero tax payment in any post-disclosure
year reduces an MP’s re-election probability. We generally obtain negative coeffi-
cients from these regressions, but because zero tax payments are rare (other than
in the tax year 2012)29, most of these coefficients are indistinguishable from zero.
Overall, the evidence in this section (Tables X-XI, andA.XIII-A.XIV) is consistent
with the notion that the electorate rewarded higher tax payments. In combination
with the evidence in the last section, it also suggests that the public disclosure and
TPHC programsmay have initiated a gradual shift of the social equilibrium toward
compliance.
VII Conclusion
We analyze two Pakistani programs to explore the roles of both deterrence as well
as social and psychological factors in the tax compliance choice of agents. In the
first of these programs, the government began revealing the tax liability reported
by every taxpayer in the country. The disclosure program exposes tax evaders to
the fear of whistle-blowing frompeer groups in case the tax payments do notmatch
the level of consumption and wealth observed by them. It may also exacerbate the
guilt and shame felt by potential evaders.
We find that, relative to those unexposed to the program, the tax paid by in-
dividuals exposed to the program on average went up by about 9 log points. The
increase was far greater for the subsample where the exposure was more salient
and peers more responsive. In the second of these programs, the government be-
gan acknowledging and honoring top taxpayers in the country. We find that, as a
29MPs in our sample were elected to office in May 2013. The 2012 tax year runs from July 2012
to June 2013. Because MPs did not receive salary from the government for the complete year, they
were more likely to report zero tax payments in 2012 than in any other year.
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result of the program, the tax liability reported by treated taxpayers in the neighbor-
hood of the program thresholdwent up by approximately 17 log points. Exploiting
spatial dimension of our data, we document a catch-up pattern of response to the
public disclosure, whereby tax payments of bottom taxpayers in more compliant
neighborhoods increased over time. We also document a strong, positive correla-
tion between the electoral success of MPs and their disclosed tax payments. These
two pieces of evidence suggest that the public disclosure and TPHC programsmay
also have initiated a gradual shift of the social equilibrium toward compliance.
That these programs produce significant response has important implications.
It shows that fear of detection and punishment as well as shame and pride may,
in some settings, be meaningful determinants of behavior that economic models
need to take into account. From a policy standpoint, the results show that pub-
lic disclosure and social recognition of top taxpayers can be effective enforcement
instruments. To the extent that fear, shame, and pride motivate humans toward
pro-social behavior, the governments can leverage them to promote compliance
and hence welfare. These programs cost little resources, and therefore can be a
cost-effective complement to the other costly measures the governments undertake
to deter noncompliance.
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Figure I: Distribution of Names
A: Number of Taxpayers
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
N
um
be
r o
f T
ax
pa
ye
rs
 (0
00
s)
1
2−
5
6−
10
11
−2
0
21
−5
0
51
−1
00
10
1−
50
0
50
1−
50
00
>
50
00
Name Frequency
2012 2013 2014 2015
B: Fraction of Taxpayers
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Notes: The figure illustrates the distribution of full names in Pakistan. We define Name Frequency as the
number of times a full name appears in the disclosure data for the years 2012-2015. The Name Frequency
of 4, for example, means that the full name appears four times in four years of data. The two panels
plot the distribution of the variable. Each marker in panel A denotes the number of individuals in year
t whose Name Frequency falls in the interval indicated in the horizontal axis. Panel B plots the fraction
of taxpayers in place of the number. We treat all English variants of an Urdu name as one. For example
Muhammad spelled as Mohammad, Mohammed, or Muhammed is treated as one name. The algorithm
we use to clean such spelling variations is described in Appendix A.1.
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Figure II: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program
A: Name Frequency ≤ 10 Vs. Others B: Below Vs. Above Median
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C: Bottom Vs. Top Quartile D: Bottom Vs. Top Decile
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Notes: The figure plots the coefficients γjs and 95% confidence interval around them from the event study
equation (6). We estimate the equation on a balanced panel sample of self-employed taxpayers, who file
in all years from 2006 to 2015. The definitions of the treatment and control groups are provided in the title
of each panel. For example, for Panel A all observations where full name of the taxpayer appears at the
most ten times in the four years’ disclosure data are considered as treated; the rest of the taxpayers serve
as the control group. The first decile, first quartile, median, third quartile, and top decile of the Name
Frequency distribution are 4, 6, 76, 1853, and 6091, respectively. For Panels C-D, we drop observations in
the middle of the distribution: the middle two quartiles in Panel C and the middle eight deciles in Panel
D. The standard errors have been clustered at the individual level. Vertical lines demarcate the time from
which the public disclosure begins to have an effect on the tax paid by individuals.
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Figure III: Extensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program
A: Name Frequency ≤ 10 Vs. Others B: Below Vs. Above Median
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Notes: The figure plots the log of number of treatment and control self-employed tax filers from 2006 to
2015. We normalize the log of number of filers in each group to one in 2006 and track its evolution in
the next nine years. The definitions of the treatment and control groups are provided in the title of each
panel. For example, for Panel A all observations where full name of the taxpayer appears at the most ten
times in the four years’ disclosure data are considered as treated; the rest of the taxpayers are considered
as the control group. The first decile, first quartile, median, third quartile, and top decile of the Name
Frequency distribution are 4, 6, 76, 1853, and 6091, respectively. For Panels C-D, we drop observations in
the middle of the distribution: the middle two quartiles in Panel C and the middle eight deciles in Panel
D. Vertical lines demarcate the time from which the public disclosure begins to have an effect on the tax
paid by individuals.
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Figure IV: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – MPs
A: All B: Self-Employed Only
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C: Dropping Less Frequent Names D: Dropping Less Frequent Names
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Notes: The figure displays how the tax paid by MPs reacts to the public disclosure program. The figure
plots the coefficients γjs and 95% confidence interval around them from the event study equation (6). We
estimate the equation on a balanced panel sample of individuals who file in all years from 2006 to 2015.
For these regressions, the dummy variable treati indicates that the individual has been anMP during the
2013-2018 election cycle of Pakistan. Panel A compares all MPs to all other individuals. Panel B restricts
the comparison to the self-employed individuals only. Panel C-D replicate Panels A-B but drop non-MP
taxpayers with Name Frequency up to 300. The standard errors have been clustered at the individual
level. Vertical lines demarcate the time from which the public disclosure begins to have an effect on the
tax paid by individuals.
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Figure V: Extensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – MPs
A: All B: Ruling Party Vs. Others
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Notes: The figure plots the fraction ofMPswho file their tax return in the year indicated in the horizontal
axis. MP denotes an individual who has been a member of a federal or provincial legislature in the
2013-2018 election cycle of Pakistan. Ruling Party denotes the party that formed the federal or provincial
government theMP belongs to. The dummy Tightly Contested takes the value 1 if the difference between
the winning and runner-up candidates is less than 2% of the valid votes. Federal Minister is an MP who
has been a minister in the federal cabinet at any time during the period 2013-2018, including the Speaker
andDeputy Speaker of theNational Assembly. RepeatMPdenotes an individualwho has been amember
of both the 2008-2013 and 2013-2018 parliaments of Pakistan. Vertical lines demarcate the time fromwhich
the public disclosure begins to have an effect on the tax filing of MPs.
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Figure VI: Response to the TPHC Program
A: Three-Year Averages
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B: Pre-program Vs. Post-program
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Notes: The figure explores the response to the TPHC program. We rank taxpayers in each of the four
categories—self-employed, wage-earners, partnerships, and corporations—on the basis of tax paid by
them in period t, group them into 20 rank bins, and plot the average log change in tax paid from period t
to t+1 in the bin as a function of the rank in period t. Panel A takes the average over three-year periods;
Panel B over the entire pre- and post-program periods. The upper bound of the bin is always included
in the bin. For example, the bin indicated by 40 includes 21-40 ranked taxpayers of each category. The
vertical line demarcates the eligibility cutoff of the program.
44
Table I: Timeline of the Public Disclosure Program
Date Event
(1) (2)
Sep-Dec, 2012 Investigative reports alleging tax noncompliance by MPs begin appearing in the press
December, 2012 First CIRP report published. It publishes the data that formed the basis of earlier investigative
reports, cataloging tax noncompliance of MPs elected in the 2008-2013 election cycle of Pakistan
December, 2012 The Federal Tax Ombudsman orders the FBR to begin disclosing the tax paid by every
public office holder in the country
January, 2013 The leading opposition party and eventual election winner, PML-N, issue election manifesto,
pledging the public disclosure of tax paid by all taxpayers in the country
May 11, 2013 General elections
June 30, 2013 Tax year 2012 ends
December 15, 2013 Final date for filing of 2012 tax return
December, 2013 Second CIPR report published. It documents the tax payments of MPs who won during the
2013 elections
February 28, 2014 MPs’ directory for tax year 2012 published
April 15, 2014 All taxpayers’ directory for tax year 2012 published
June 30, 2014 Tax year 2013 ends
April 10, 2015 MPs’ and all taxpayers’ directories for tax year 2013 published
June 30, 2015 Tax year 2014 ends
June 30, 2016 Tax year 2015 ends
September 9, 2016 MPs’ and all taxpayers’ directories for tax year 2014 published
July 27, 2017 MPs’ directory for tax year 2015 published
August 11, 2017 All taxpayers’ directory for tax year 2015 published
Notes: The table report the timeline of important events in the public disclosure program. The date each event listed in column
(2) occurred is given in column (1). Pakistani tax year runs from July to June. Tax year indicated by t in this paper runs from July t
to June t+ 1. The first CIRP report indicated in the second row is available here; the second report indicated in the eighth event is
available here. Tax directories of all years can be downloaded from here.
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Table II: Summary Statistics
2011 2010
Treatment Control Treatment Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Taxable Income:
25th percentile 12.281 12.255 12.044 12.017
Median 12.560 12.516 12.304 12.255
Mean 12.505 12.459 12.306 12.248
75th percentile 12.723 12.680 12.554 12.497
90th percentile 12.899 12.766 12.766 12.612
2. Tax on taxable income:
25th percentile 10.271 10.244 10.091 10.070
Median 10.521 10.494 10.337 10.264
Mean 11.064 11.015 10.737 10.567
75th percentile 11.845 11.884 11.081 10.531
90th percentile 12.848 12.613 12.520 12.155
3. Tax at source:
25th percentile 9.502 9.517 9.287 9.259
Median 10.917 10.943 10.625 10.540
Mean 10.915 10.984 10.678 10.687
75th percentile 12.411 12.475 12.132 12.162
90th percentile 13.699 13.804 13.450 13.526
4. Major city 0.462 0.336 0.458 0.334
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
5. Business in other city 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
6. More than one businesses 0.158 0.131 0.157 0.129
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
7. Male 0.919 0.986 0.924 0.986
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
8. Early filer 0.615 0.642 0.554 0.543
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
9. Young 0.545 0.507 0.521 0.485
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
10. Buncher 0.049 0.054 0.044 0.046
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
11. Strictly dominated choice 0.018 0.016 0.022 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
12. Revised return 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the treatment and control groups of self-employed tax-
payers. Treatment group comprises individuals whose Name Frequency does not exceed 40. We first
compare five moments of the log of taxable income, tax paid on taxable income, and tax paid at source
distributions for the two pre-program years across the two groups. Rest of the rows present themean and
standard error of nine taxpayer traits, all defined as dummy variables. The definitions of these dummy
variables are provided in Appendix A.2 of the paper.
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Table III: Balance of Treatment Control Samples
Major Business in Multiple Male Early Young Buncher Dominated Revised
City Other City Businesses Filer Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A: Complete Panel (2006-2011)
treat × after 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.012 -0.000 -0.016 0.002 0.014 0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
treat × trait × after 0.003 -0.011 -0.012 -0.001 0.021 -0.017 0.025 -0.001 0.070
(0.013) (0.026) (0.019) (0.044) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.030) (0.058)
Observations 1,484,133 917,213 1,484,174 1,482,108 1,430,873 574,137 1,496,374 1,496,374 1,496,374
B: Balanced Panel (2006-2011)
treat × after -0.007 -0.004 0.007 0.007 -0.001 -0.010 0.004 0.009 0.009
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
treat × trait × after 0.023 -0.020 -0.016 -0.028 0.016 -0.038 0.010 0.027 0.060
(0.016) (0.034) (0.024) (0.058) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.034) (0.064)
Observations 837,536 486,993 837,550 837,147 807,171 288,788 840,469 840,469 840,469
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table illustrates that conditional on the individual fixed effects the evolution of our outcome variable is independent of taxpayer traits
shown in the column headings, listed in Table II, and defined in A.2. We estimate a triple-difference version of model (5) on the pre-program years
2006-2011, defining the last two years as the after years. The sample is all self-employed taxpayers. Treatment here is defined as an individual whose
Name Frequency does not exceed 40. To avoid making strong functional form assumptions all traits are introduced into the equation nonparametri-
cally, as dummy variables. The model includes a full set of double-interaction terms. Panel B reports the results for a balanced panel sample, where
we include only the taxpayers who file in all years included in the sample.
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Table IV: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program
Treat: Name Frequency
≤ 10 ≤ 20 ≤ 30 ≤ 40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Main Regression (2006-2015)
treat × after 0.094 0.093 0.090 0.089 0.089 0.086 0.088 0.086
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 2,430,002 773,038 2,614,754 833,675 2,720,267 868,250 2,792,270 891,420
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011)
treat × after 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Observations 1,307,541 734,269 1,403,240 787,845 1,458,457 818,942 1,496,374 840,469
Sample:
Balanced Panel No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the estimates from equation (5). For Panel A, we estimate the equation on a sample containing all self-employed
individuals for the period 2006-2015. The definition of the treatment variable is provided in the title of each column. The dummy variable
takes the value 1 if the Name Frequency of an individual does not exceed the cutoff indicated in the title. To maintain a fixed control
group across all columns, we drop taxpayers with Name Frequency between 10 and 40 in Columns (1) to (6). Panel B reports the results
from parallel placebo regressions, where the sample is restricted to tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined as the post-
program years. Even-numbered columns restrict the sample to a balanced panel of taxpayers, who file in all years included in the sample.
Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table V: Public Disclosure Response Across the Name Distribution
Baseline Specification Placebo Specification
(2006-2015) (2006-2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Name Freq ∈ (0, 50] × after 0.107 0.105 0.020 0.013
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Name Freq ∈ (50, 100] × after 0.067 0.069 0.014 0.003
(0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Name Freq ∈ (100, 150] × after 0.061 0.080 0.027 0.036
(0.015) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023)
Name Freq ∈ (150, 200] × after 0.050 0.046 0.029 0.034
(0.019) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030)
Name Freq ∈ (200, 250] × after 0.043 0.011 0.014 -0.005
(0.021) (0.031) (0.026) (0.032)
Name Freq ∈ (250, 300] × after 0.045 0.022 -0.014 -0.027
(0.022) (0.033) (0.028) (0.036)
Name Freq ∈ (300, 350] × after 0.047 0.086 0.032 0.042
(0.025) (0.038) (0.032) (0.039)
Name Freq ∈ (350, 400] × after 0.037 0.039 0.028 0.021
(0.027) (0.041) (0.037) (0.043)
Name Freq ∈ (400, 450] × after 0.035 0.017 0.017 0.029
(0.026) (0.039) (0.033) (0.041)
Observations 2,792,270 891,420 1,496,374 840,469
Sample:
Balanced Panel No Yes No Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores how the intensive margin response to the public disclosure program
varies across the name distribution. We estimate an augmented version of equation (5), including
the nine interaction terms shown above. The equation is estimated on a sample of all self-employed
individuals. The control group in these regression are the self-employed whose Name Frequency
exceeds 450. The coefficient on each interaction terms accordingly captures the average additional
tax paid (in log points) by the self-employed with Name Frequency falling in the interval as a result
of the program. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the baseline specification containing
periods 2006-2015, both for the complete and balanced panels. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the
specifications on the pre-program years only, defining the years 2010 and 2011 as the post-program
period. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table VI: Extensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program
Treat: Name Frequency
≤ 10 ≤ 20 ≤ 30 ≤ 40 ≤Median ≤ 1st Quartile ≤ 1st Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A: Main Regression (2006-2015)
treat × after 0.0117 0.0106 0.0101 0.0097 0.0094 0.0163 0.0265
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0041) (0.0089)
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011)
treat × after 0.0027 0.0027 0.0026 0.0025 0.0024 0.0038 0.0026
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Notes: The table reports the estimates from equation (8). The equation is estimated on a sample of all self-employed individuals.
The outcome variable here is the log number of filers in group g in year t. Panel A estimates the equation on the period 2006-2015.
The definition of the treatment variable is provided in the title of each column. The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the Name
Frequency of an individual does not exceed the cutoff indicated in the title. To maintain a fixed control group across columns
(1)-(4), we drop taxpayers with the Name Frequency between 10 and 40 in columns (1) to (3). In columns (6) and (7) we drop the
middle part of the distribution: the middle two quartiles in column (6) and the deciles 2-9 in column (7). Panel B reports the results
from parallel placebo regressions, where the sample is restricted to tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined as the
post-program years. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table VII: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – MPs
Complete Panel Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Main Regression (2006-2015)
treat × after 0.407 0.900 0.519 0.966 0.651 0.906 0.756 0.965
(0.069) (0.117) (0.070) (0.115) (0.097) (0.165) (0.097) (0.165)
Observations 5,832,527 2,968,236 1,747,719 1,105,038 1,304,247 971,216 454,364 379,390
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011)
treat × after 0.033 0.374 0.089 0.385 0.173 0.368 0.243 0.384
(0.082) (0.151) (0.082) (0.148) (0.114) (0.203) (0.114) (0.202)
Observations 3,098,528 1,670,694 963,113 646,461 800,475 610,799 286,013 243,515
Sample:
Wage-earners Dropped No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control Group:
Less-Common Names Dropped No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the results from equation (5). We estimate the equation on a sample containing all individuals (both MPs and non-
MPs). The dummy variable treati denotes an individual who has been an MP in the 2013-2018 election cycle of Pakistan. Even-numbered
columns drop wage-earners; columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) drop individuals with Name Frequency up to 300, and columns (5)-(8) restrict the
sample to a balanced panel of individuals who file in all years included in the sample (2006-2015 in Panel A and 2006-2011 in Panel B). Panel
B reports the results from parallel placebo regressions, where the sample is restricted to tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined
as the post-program years. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table VIII: Response to the TPHC Program
Treat: Rank
∈ (80, 120] ∈ (70, 130] ∈ (60, 140] ∈ (50, 150]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Main Regression (2006-2014)
treat × after 0.166 0.138 0.171 0.161 0.136 0.126 0.140 0.128
(0.075) (0.077) (0.062) (0.064) (0.054) (0.055) (0.048) (0.049)
treat × 1.(year ∈ {2010,2011}) -0.163 -0.060 -0.058 -0.070
(0.151) (0.126) (0.115) (0.105)
Observations 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2010)
treat × after 0.019 0.010 -0.086 -0.090
(0.120) (0.102) (0.091) (0.081)
Observations 17,208 17,208 17,208 17,208
Notes: The table reports the results from the equation (7). We estimate the equation on a sample containing top 1000 taxpay-
ers of each of the four categories of taxpayers, corporations, partnerships, self-employed, and wage-earners. The treatment
variable here denotes taxpayers ranked in period t in a window around the eligibility cutoff of the program. The exact length
of the treatment window is indicated in the title of each column. Given that we measure the outcome variable here in changes
rather than levels, the first post-program year is 2012. Panel A estimates the equation on years 2006-2014. Panel B runs parallel
placebo regressions on years 2006-2010, with the last two years defined as the post-program years. Columns (2), (4), (6) and
(8) test the parallel trend assumption by including a treat× 1.(year ∈ {2010, 2011} interaction into the regression. Standard
errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table IX: Public Disclosure and Social Norms
Trait: Neighborhoods
With Proportion of Less-Common-Named With Proportion of Less-Common-Named
Wage-earners Above the Median Top Taxpayers Above the Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treat × after 0.080 0.079 -0.013 0.030 0.069 0.069 -0.022 0.031
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008)
treat × trait × 2012 -0.005 -0.025 -0.043 -0.155 0.010 -0.034 -0.031 -0.256
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
treat × trait × 2013 -0.027 -0.022 -0.040 -0.008 -0.028 -0.016 -0.008 -0.026
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015)
treat × trait × 2014 0.037 0.040 0.012 0.081 0.047 0.056 0.027 0.115
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015)
treat × trait × 2015 0.038 0.044 -0.011 0.104 0.048 0.058 -0.006 0.158
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016)
Included Taxpayers All All Top Bottom All All Top Bottom
Major Cities Dropped No Yes No No No Yes No No
Observations 2,131,611 2,043,533 657,201 1,474,410 2,045,955 1,962,510 649,939 1,396,016
Notes: The table explores if the public disclosure program caused a shift in social norms towards compliance. We estimate
an augmented version of equation (5) by adding the four trait × year interactions into the model. The dummy variable trait
represents a neighborhood with the characteristic shown in the column heading. Neighborhood denotes the subdistrict a tax-
payer resides in. There are 1,145 subdistricts in our data with a typical subdistrict containing 470 taxpayers of whom 92 are
less-common-named wage-earners. We define a taxpayer as a top taxpayer if it falls in the top quartile of the tax-paid distribu-
tion of the baseline year i.e. 2012. All even-numbered columns drop subdistricts located in Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad.
Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) rerun the baseline model on the sample of top and bottom taxpayers only. Standard errors are in
parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table X: Public Disclosure and Electoral Success
Definition of Tax Paid:
Tax Paid Tax Paid Tax Paid Tax Paid Max Tax Min Tax Sum of Diff of
in 2012 in 2013 in 2014 in 2015 Paid Paid Tax Paid 2015 & 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tax Paid 0.064 0.064 0.043 0.043 0.068 0.057 0.062 0.025
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 478 702 734 738 838 838 863 863
Notes: The table explores if the electoral performance of MPs is correlated with their disclosed tax payments. We report results from Linear
Probability Models where the outcome variable is an indicator denoting that MP iwon a legislative seat in the 2018 election. The RHS variable
is the log of tax paid by the MP (the exact definition of the variable is in the heading of each column). We normalize the RHS variable by
its standard deviation. The sample includes all individuals who were directly elected to a legislative house in the 2013-2018 parliament of
Pakistan. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table XI: Public Disclosure and Electoral Success
Definition of Tax Paid:
Tax Paid in 2012 Tax Paid in 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Tax Paid 0.064 0.061 0.058 0.051 0.053 0.050 0.043 0.059 0.071 0.061 0.064 0.060
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 478 478 478 477 475 475 738 738 738 737 732 732
Controls:
Party Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
House Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
% Votes Obtained in 2013 No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Winning Margin in 2013 No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Federal Minister No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
Notes: The table replicates the specifications in column (1) and (4) of the above table (Table X). We introduce MP characteristics indicated in
the last four rows sequentially into the model. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Name Cleaning Algorithm
Identifying Potential Spelling Variations in Pakistani Names
Most Pakistani names are derived from Arabic, Persian or Turkish. Like Urdu, these
languages are (orwere)written in variants of theArabic script. As a result the spelling
variations in Pakistani names arise mainly because of standard issues in transliterat-
ing Arabic script into English.
The most common issue is the spelling of transliterated vowel sounds. As there
are no standardized rules for transliteration each vowel sound can be spelled inmany
different ways. In Urdu, shorter vowel sounds are not indicated through separate
letters. So, for example, the name Muhammad in Urdu is spelled with only four
letters -MHMD. In transliterating the name to English there is considerable discretion
as towhat English vowelswill be used for the sound in each syllable. The first syllable
can be spelled as M, MA, MO, MU, MUA, MOU, MU; the second syllable as HAM,
HUM, HOM, and the third syllable as MED, MAD, MD. The various combinations
of these syllables generates multiple spellings for the same name.
In Urdu, some longer vowel sounds are indicated through specific letters. How-
ever the spelling issue still persists in these cases because of a lack of transliteration
rules. For example the name Mehmood in Urdu is spelled with five letters - MH-
MUD. The added vowel represents the “oo” sound as in “rude” but it can be spelled
in English as either U OO OU or UO.
Secondly, in Urdu elongated sounds or sounds that are repeated across syllables
are not indicated through double letters (as is often the case in English) but are also
expressed through accent marks. Again taking the case of the nameMuhammad, the
middle “m” sound is repeated but spelt with a single letter in Urdu. In English the
repeated sound can be spelled as M or MM depending on whether the spelling is
based on the Urdu spelling or the phonetic sound.
So for a givenUrdu name, the vowel and repeated sounds imply potential spelling
variations which we use to identify variants of the same name.
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Standardizing Full Names
The tax directory published by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) lists each tax-
payer’s full name. We combine the tax directories for all “Individual” taxpayers for
2012-2015 to get an exhaustive list of all full names that have ever appeared in the
disclosure data. We then split the full names, based on spaces or hyphens, into the
different (given or family) single names they constitute. This gives us a master list of
all distinct single names in the data.
Given the possible spelling variations we manually work through this master list
to identify the English variants of the same Urdu names. By convention, certain
spellings of names have become more common and widely used. Each name variant
is standardized to the most common spelling used for that name in the data. After
the spellings of the single names are standardized we combine them back again to
create standardized full names. The name frequencymeasures we use in the analysis
are based on these standardized full names.
A.2 Definition of Variables
(i) Major city. The taxpayer reports an address in one of the threemajor cities—Karachi,
Lahore, and Islamabad—of Pakistan.
(ii) Business in other city. The taxpayer conducts business in a city different from
where he or she resides.
(iii) Multiple businesses. The taxpayer owns more than one businesses.
(iv) Early filer. The taxpayer files their return relatively early. The dummy variable
takes the value 1 if the taxpayer filed their return for year t before the median
filing date for the year.
(v) Young. If the taxpayer is younger than the median income tax filer for the year
t.
(vi) Buncher. If the taxpayer reported income at or within a window of ten thou-
sand PKR below any notch in the corresponding tax schedule.
(vii) Strictly dominated choice. If the taxpayer reported income within the strictly
dominated region above any notch in the corresponding tax schedule.
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(viii) Revised return. If the taxpayer filed a revised return for the given tax year t.
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Figure A.I: Special Immigration Counter for TPHC Holders
Notes: The figure shows the picture of special immigration counter at the Allama Iqbal In-
ternational Airport, Lahore. The picture was taken in the summer of 2018.
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Figure A.II: Distribution of Names – Original Spelling
A: Number of Taxpayers
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Notes: The figure illustrates the distribution of full names in Pakistan. We define Name
Frequency as the number of times a full name appears in the disclosure data for the years
2012-2015. The Name Frequency of 4, for example, means that the full name appears four
times in four years of data. The two panels plot the distribution of the variable. Each marker
in panel A denotes the number of individuals in year twhose Name Frequency falls in the in-
terval indicated in the horizontal axis. Panel B plots the fraction in place of the number. Here,
we treat all English variants of an Urdu name as distinct names. For example Muhammad,
Mohammad, Mohammed, and Muhammed are treated as distinct names.
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Table A.I: Structure of Pakistani Legislature
House Total Seats Directly Elected Reserved
Women Minorities Technocrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National Assembly 342 272 60 10 -
Senate 104 66 17 4 17
Punjab Assembly 371 297 66 8 -
Sind Assembly 168 130 29 9 -
KP Assembly 124 99 22 3 -
Balochistan Assembly 65 51 11 3 -
Total 1174 915 205 37 17
Notes: The table shows the composition of the Pakistani legislature. National Assembly and Senate are the
two houses at the Federal level. Pakistan has four provinces: Punjab, Sind, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwah (KP),
and Balochistan. Each province has its own legislature. The legislative powers are divided between the
federation and provinces by the constitution. Seats are reserved for women and religious minorities (non-
Muslims) in every house and for technocrats in Senate. Reserved seats are filled through a proportional
representation system.
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Table A.II: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – Placebo
Treat: Name Frequency
≤ 10 ≤ 20 ≤ 30 ≤ 40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: 2006-2015
treat × after -0.255 -0.302 -0.221 -0.227 -0.230 -0.254 -0.226 -0.235
(0.181) (0.233) (0.179) (0.229) (0.179) (0.228) (0.178) (0.227)
Observations 4,818 1,345 5,147 1,469 5,334 1,507 5,452 1,544
B: 2006-2011
treat × after -0.178 -0.183 -0.131 -0.093 -0.148 -0.119 -0.148 -0.121
(0.183) (0.245) (0.182) (0.245) (0.180) (0.243) (0.179) (0.242)
Observations 1,521 770 1,621 838 1,680 862 1,713 883
Sample:
Balanced Panel No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table illustrates that the name of a taxpayer does not influence their tax payment as long as the effectiveness
of the disclosure is independent of the name. We replicate Table IV on a sample of MPs only. As MPs are (i) well-known
and (ii) identified in the disclosed data directly through their constituency numbers, their exposure to the program does
not depend upon how common their name is. As earlier, the definition of the treatment variable is provided in the title of
each column. The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the Name Frequency of theMP does not exceed the cutoff indicated
in the title. To maintain a fixed control group across all columns, we drop MPs with Name Frequency between 10 and
40 in Columns (1) to (6). Panel B reports the results from a parallel placebo regression, where the sample is restricted to
tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined as the post-program years. Even-numbered columns restrict the
sample to a balanced panel of MPs, who file in all years included in the sample. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which
have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table A.III: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – Alternative Definition of Name Frequency
Treat: Name Frequency
≤ 10 ≤ 20 ≤ 30 ≤ 40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Main Regression (2006-2015)
treat × after 0.098 0.094 0.093 0.092 0.092 0.091 0.091 0.088
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 2,394,847 764,796 2,621,675 837,306 2,704,406 863,405 2,792,270 891,420
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011)
treat × after 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.013
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Observations 1,288,038 723,868 1,406,460 789,856 1,449,905 814,280 1,496,374 840,469
Sample:
Balanced Panel No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the estimates from equation (5). We replicate Table IV using an alternative definition of the variable Name Frequency.
Instead of defining Name Frequency as the number of times a full name appears in the four years of disclosed data (2012-2015), we define it
as 4 × the number of times a full name appears in the 2012 disclosed data. We multiply the number of occurrences of a name in 2012 by four
to make this alternative definition of Name Frequency more compatible with the one in our baseline specification. Other than this change of
definition, the table is constructed exactly similar to Table IV. We obtain similar results if we use any other post-disclosure year 2013-2015 in
place of 2012 used here to define Name Frequency.
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Table A.IV: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – By Baseline Taxable Income
Baseline Taxable Income:
∈ (0, 100k] ∈ (100k, 200k] ∈ (200k, 300k] ∈ (300k, 400k] ∈ (400k, 500k] ∈ (500k, 600k]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Main Regression (2006-2015)
treat × after 0.075 0.083 0.061 0.058 0.014 -0.026
(0.059) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.028) (0.056)
Observations 26,071 197,583 575,312 447,856 60,784 14,442
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011)
treat × after 0.058 0.019 0.005 -0.029 -0.072 -0.069
(0.046) (0.010) (0.021) (0.024) (0.036) (0.078)
Observations 44,234 760,496 104,403 38,149 21,214 5,214
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores how the intensive margin response to the public disclosure program varies across the taxable income distribu-
tion. We replicate the specification in Column (7) of Table IV restraining the sample to taxpayers whose taxable income in the baseline
year (2011) was within the interval indicated in the heading of each column. The treatment variable takes the value 1 if the Name Fre-
quency of an individual does not exceed 40. Panel B reports the results fromparallel placebo regressions, where the sample is restricted to
tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined as the post-program years. The baseline year for these regression is 2009. Standard
errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table A.V: Heterogeneity in Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program
Major Business in Multiple Male Early Young Buncher Dominated Revised
City Other City Businesses Filer Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
treat × after 0.066 0.068 0.090 0.137 0.075 0.050 0.083 0.088 0.089
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.038) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
treat × trait × after 0.032 -0.007 -0.068 -0.052 0.017 -0.018 0.004 0.003 -0.019
(0.010) (0.021) (0.016) (0.038) (0.014) (0.017) (0.010) (0.025) (0.051)
Baseline Coefficient 0.088 0.068 0.088 0.088 0.081 0.049 0.088 0.088 0.088
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 2,767,938 1,780,777 2,767,995 2,763,734 1,628,762 1,329,391 2,792,270 2,792,270 2,792,270
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores heterogeneity in the intensive margin response to the public disclosure program. We estimate a triple-difference version
of equation (5) to see how the response varies across taxpayers of different traits. Treatment here is defined as an individual whose Name Frequency
does not exceed 40, so the estimates correspond to the specification in Column (7) of Table IV. To avoid making strong functional form assumptions
all traits are introduced into the equation nonparametrically, as dummy variables. The dummy variable in the first column indicates if the taxpayer
belongs to Karachi, Lahore, or Islamabad; in the second column if the taxpayer has business in a city different from the one he resides in; in the third
column if the taxpayer has more than one businesses; in the fourth column if the taxpayer is a male, in the fifth column if the taxpayer routinely
files her return before the median filing date; in the sixth column if the taxpayer is younger than the median tax filers; in the seventh column if the
taxpayer bunched at any of the notches in the 2006-09 tax system of Pakistan; in the eighth column if the taxpayer was in a dominated region above
any of the notches; and in the final column if the taxpayer filed a revised return in any of the pre-program periods. We do not observe some of the
traits for the whole sample. The Baseline Coefficient reports the treat×after coefficient in equation (5) for the restricted sample for which we observe
the trait. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table A.VI: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure – MPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat × after 0.407 0.489 0.401 0.399 0.371 0.491
(0.069) (0.108) (0.100) (0.070) (0.072) (0.091)
treat × after × ruling party -0.154
(0.140)
treat × after × federal 0.012
(0.138)
treat × after × tightly contested 0.181
(0.406)
treat × after × federal minister 0.514
(0.220)
treat × after × repeat MP -0.197
0.137
Observations 5,832,527 5,832,527 5,832,527 5,832,527 5,832,527 5,832,527
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores heterogeneity inMPs’ intensive margin response to the public disclosure program. We estimate
a triple-difference version of model (5), adding the interaction terms shown above. Columns (1) reproduces the corre-
sponding column in Table VII. The other columns add interaction terms to these baseline specifications. Ruling Party
denotes the party that formed the federal or provincial government the MP belongs to. The dummy Tightly Contested
takes the value 1 if the difference between thewinning and runner-up candidates is less than 2% of the valid votes. Federal
Minister is an MP who has been a minister in the federal cabinet at any time during the period 2013-2018, including the
Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly. Repeat MP denotes an individual who has been amember of both
the 2008-2013 and 2013-2018 parliaments of Pakistan. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the
individual level.
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Table A.VII: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure – MPs (Balanced Panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat × after 0.651 0.653 0.626 0.656 0.581 0.705
(0.097) (0.164) (0.136) (0.099) (0.099) (0.126)
treat × after × ruling party -0.003
(0.200)
treat × after × federal 0.054
(0.193)
treat × after × tightly contested -0.141
(0.522)
treat × after × federal minister 1.082
(0.323)
treat × after × repeat MP -0.136
0.193
Observations 1,304,247 1,304,247 1,304,247 1,304,247 1,304,247 1,304,247
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores heterogeneity inMPs’ intensive margin response to the public disclosure program. We estimate
a triple-difference version of model (5), adding the interaction terms shown above. The regressions are run on a balanced
panel containing only the taxpayers who file in all years included in the sample. Columns (1) reproduces the column (5)
in Table VII. The other columns add interaction terms to these baseline specifications. Ruling Party denotes the party that
formed the federal or provincial government the MP belongs to. The dummy Tightly Contested takes the value 1 if the
difference between the winning and runner-up candidates is less than 2% of the valid votes. Federal Minister is an MP
who has been a minister in the federal cabinet at any time during the period 2013-2018, including the Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the National Assembly. Repeat MP denotes an individual who has been a member of both the 2008-2013 and
2013-2018 parliaments of Pakistan. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table A.VIII: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure – MPs (Placebo)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat × after 0.033 -0.065 0.033 0.043 -0.003 0.057
(0.082) (0.126) (0.105) (0.084) (0.087) (0.112)
treat × after × ruling party 0.192
(0.164)
treat × after × federal 0.001
(0.164)
treat × after × tightly contested -0.282
(0.229)
treat × after × federal minister 0.465
(0.222)
treat × after × repeat MP -0.051
0.164
Observations 3,098,528 3,098,528 3,098,528 3,098,528 3,098,528 3,098,528
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table explores heterogeneity inMPs’ intensive margin response to the public disclosure program. We estimate
a triple-difference version of model (5), adding the interaction terms shown above. The regressions are run on the pre-
program periods only, defining 2010 and 2011 as the “after” years. Columns (1) reproduces the corresponding column in
Table VII. The other columns add interaction terms to these baseline specifications. Ruling Party denotes the party that
formed the federal or provincial government the MP belongs to. The dummy Tightly Contested takes the value 1 if the
difference between the winning and runner-up candidates is less than 2% of the valid votes. Federal Minister is an MP
who has been a minister in the federal cabinet at any time during the period 2013-2018, including the Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the National Assembly. Repeat MP denotes an individual who has been a member of both the 2008-2013 and
2013-2018 parliaments of Pakistan. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table A.IX: Extensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure – MPs
Dependent Variable: Filed in year t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.(year ≥ 2012) 0.592 0.588 0.618 0.587 0.598 0.596
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
1.(year ≥ 2012) × ruling party 0.008
(0.014)
1.(year ≥ 2012) × federal -0.065
(0.014)
1.(year ≥ 2012) × tightly contested 0.082
(0.028)
1.(year ≥ 2012) × federal minister -0.149
(0.035)
1.(year ≥ 2012) × repeat MP -0.013
(0.014)
Constant 0.313 0.309 0.278 0.318 0.306 0.290
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 12,300 12,300 12,300 12,300 12,300 12,300
Notes: The table explores heterogeneity in MPs’ extensive margin response to the public disclosure pro-
gram. We estimate a linear probability model. The outcome is a dummy variable, indicating if MP i files
a tax return in period t. In a world with full compliance, everyMP files a tax return and the coefficient on
the post-program dummy 1.(year ≥ 2012)would be insignificant. Column (1), however, shows that only
around one-third of MPs were filing tax returns prior to the disclosure. The filing rate jumped by around
60 percentage points after the disclosure. The jump was significantly higher for MPs facing tight con-
tests and lower for MPs of federal MPs and federal cabinet ministers. Ruling Party denotes the party that
formed the federal or provincial government theMP belongs to. The dummy Tightly Contested takes the
value 1 if the difference between the winning and runner-up candidates is less than 2% of the valid votes.
Federal Minister is an MP who has been a minister in the federal cabinet at any time during the period
2013-2018, including the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly. Repeat MP denotes an
individual who has been a member of both the 2008-2013 and 2013-2018 parliaments of Pakistan. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table A.X: Response to the TPHC Program – Placebo
Treat: Rank
∈ (150, 200] ∈ (200, 250] ∈ (250, 300] ∈ (300, 350]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Main Regression (2006-2014)
treat × after -0.029 -0.001 0.027 0.054 -0.004 0.019 -0.021 -0.003
(0.068) (0.076) (0.065) (0.072) (0.058) (0.065) (0.066) (0.071)
treat × 1.(year ∈ {2010,2011}) 0.079 0.083 0.065 0.054
(0.098) (0.085) (0.081) (0.093)
Observations 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047 32,047
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2010)
treat × after 0.084 0.025 -0.040 0.058
(0.100) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094)
Observations 17,208 17,208 17,208 17,208
Notes: The table tests the validity of the research design used to estimate the TPHC response. We estimate equation (7) on a
sample containing top 1000 taxpayers of each of the four categories of taxpayers, corporations, partnerships, self-employed,
and wage-earners. But in distinction to Table VIII, the treatment variable here denotes taxpayers who are not affected by the
program, being too far away from its eligibility cutoff. The exact length of the treatment window used here is indicated in the
title of each column. Given that we measure the outcome variable here in changes rather than levels, the first post-program
year is 2012. Panel A estimates the equation on years 2006-2014. Panel B runs parallel regressions on years 2006-2010, with the
last two years defined as the post-program years. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) test the parallel trend assumption by including a
treat×1.(year ∈ {2010, 2011} interaction into the regression. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered
at the individual level.
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Table A.XI: Response to the TPHC Program – By Taxpayer Category
Treat: Rank ∈ (80, 120]
Self-Employed Wage-Earners Partnerships Corporations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Main Regression (2006-2014)
treat × after -0.033 0.013 0.215 0.276 0.036 0.089 0.412 0.267
(0.205) (0.241) (0.143) (0.172) (0.105) (0.114) (0.115) (0.129)
treat × 1.(year ∈ {2010,2011}) 0.130 0.176 0.144 -0.444
(0.221) (0.254) (0.102) (0.206)
Observations 7,619 7,619 7,914 7,914 8,185 8,185 8,329 8,329
B: Placebo Regression (2006-2010)
treat × after 0.231 0.173 0.120 -0.387
(0.278) (0.258) (0.116) (0.225)
Observations 3,993 4,241 4,420 4,554
Notes: The table breaks down the TPHC response by taxpayer category. We estimate equation (7) separately for each category
of taxpayers. These categories are indicated in the title of each column. The sample for each regression includes top 1000
taxpayers of the corresponding category in each year included in the sample. The treatment variable here denotes taxpayers of
the category ranked 81-120 in the given year. Given that wemeasure the outcome variable here in changes rather than levels, the
first post-program year is 2012. Panel A estimates the equation on years 2006-2014. Panel B runs parallel placebo regressions on
years 2006-2010, with the last two years defined as the post-program years. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) test the parallel trend
assumption by including a treat× 1.(year ∈ {2010, 2011} interaction into the regression. Standard errors are in parenthesis,
which have been clustered at the individual level.
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Table A.XII: Heterogeneity in Response to the TPHC Program
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treat × after 0.412 0.356 0.501 0.369 0.399 0.369 0.462 0.427
(0.115) (0.214) (0.124) (0.115) (0.116) (0.119) (0.124) (0.119)
treat × after × public 0.091
(0.255)
treat × after × foreign owned -0.793
(0.295)
treat × after × banking 1.241
(0.718)
treat × after × food 0.389
(0.583)
treat × after × textile 0.114
(0.272)
treat × after × pharma -0.573
(0.233)
treat × after × construction -0.342
(0.394)
Observations 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329
Notes: The table explores heterogeneity in corporate firms’ response to the TPHC program. We estimate the triple-
difference version of model (7), adding the interaction terms shown above. Columns (1) reproduces column (7) of Ta-
ble A.XI. The other columns add interaction terms to this baseline specification. The dummy variable public denotes a
public-limited corporation; foreign owned a completely-owned subsidiary of a foreign firm; and food, textile, pharma, and
construction the industry the firm operates in. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the firm
level.
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Table A.XIII: Public Disclosure and Electoral Outcomes
Outcome
Contests Finishes Increases Changes Contests
Next in Top Vote Party More Than One
Election Two Share Constituency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: 2012
Tax Paid in 2012 0.030 0.053 0.013 -0.021 -0.009
(0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 475 475 475 475 475
Unconditional Mean 0.731 0.565 0.205 0.208 0.144
B: 2015
Tax Paid in 2015 0.040 0.067 0.030 -0.028 0.012
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 732 732 732 732 732
Unconditional Mean 0.745 0.600 0.202 0.204 0.149
Controls:
Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
House Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
% Votes Obtained in 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Winning Margin in 2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table investigates if the electoral outcomes ofMPs are correlated with their tax payments. We report results from Linear
Probability Models where the outcome variable is a dummy, which takes the value 1 if the statement in the heading of each column
is true for an MP. The RHS variable of interest is the log of tax paid by the MP, in 2012 for Panel A and in 2015 for Panel B. We
normalize this variable by its standard deviation of the corresponding year. The models include the four set of covariates indicated
in the last four rows. We also report unconditional mean of the dependent variable in each column. The dummy variable in the
fourth column takes the value 1 if the MP contested the 2013 and 2018 elections on two different political parties’ tickets. The
Pakistani law allows individuals to contest from multiple constituencies simultaneously. The outcome in the final column takes
the value 1 if an MP does so.
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Table A.XIV: Public Disclosure and Electoral Outcomes
Year
2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zero Tax Paid -0.028 0.008 0.019 -0.015 -0.258 -0.301 -0.151 -0.119
(0.032) (0.035) (0.059) (0.064) (0.058) (0.081) (0.085) (0.123)
Observations 899 845 811 766 801 754 788 750
Pr {Tax Paid=0} 0.444 0.444 0.091 0.091 0.042 0.042 0.033 0.033
Controls:
Party Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
House Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
% Votes Obtained in 2013 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Winning Margin in 2013 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table investigates if reporting zero tax payment is associated with the re-election probability of an MP. We regress an
indicator that a sitting MP wins the 2018 election on a dummy denoting that the MP reported zero tax payment for the given year.
The even-numbered columns include the four sets of covariates mentioned in the last four rows into the model. The fraction of
MPs reporting zero tax is shown in the third row of the table. Note that this fraction is higher in 2012 than in other years. MPs in
our sample were elected to office in May 2013. The 2012 tax year runs from July 2012 to June 2013. Because MPs did not receive
salary from the government for the complete year, they were more likely to report zero tax payments in 2012 than in any other year.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
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